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THE DEVELOPMENTAL PATH OF THE LAWYER
MICHAEL J. CEDRONE
I. INTRODUCTION
My mother does not drive, and I own a towel that I cannot use-these
are my reasons for studying law.'
I am an integrated tapestry of elation and disappointment, risk and
reward, ambiguity and conviction .. .. I discovered [through adversity]
that transitional challenges were not permanent impediments to my
progress, but were instead emboldening catalysts to my personal evolution
and professional development.2
These two stories come from admissions essays submitted by members
of Georgetown University Law Center's class of 2014, recently published
in the Law Center's alumni magazine.3 The published essays provide
fascinating views into the personal experiences and deep reflection that
lead people to pursue legal studies.4
Both of the quoted students experienced tragedy at the hands of the
legal system. The first young man's mother does not drive after a court
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1 Ethan J. Bercot, Student Stories, REs IPSA LoQUITUR, Spring/Summer 2012, at 21, 21.
2 Tarik Ajani-Kehinde Barrett, Student Stories, REs IPSA LOQUITUR, Spring/Summer
2012, at 20, 27.
Student Stories, RES IPSA LOQUITUR, Spring/Summer 2012, at 18.
4 Id. at 18. ("No student arrives without a story. And the stories of these 1Ls are
especially riveting. They prove that Georgetown Law students have much more than good
grades and high LSAT scores. They have perseverance, passion for their cause-and a lot
of moxie.").
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summarily and perhaps unfairly judged her responsible for a car accident
that injured a pedestrian.5 His mother's treatment by the justice system and
the motto of his small Christian college, "Be great-serve," motivate his
career in law.6 The writer aspires to "'be great,' . . . [by] serv[ing] those
like [his] mother, who, while serving others, need to be served
themselves."7 The second man's essay probes his relationship with his
incarcerated brother and concludes that he and his brother are not
fundamentally all that different. He, too, wants to use a legal education to
achieve his life goals. 9
The stories continue. An officer in the Montgomery County Police
Department envisions a broader role for herself in criminal court.'0 A
District of Columbia teacher of students with special needs blows the
whistle on administrators and colleagues for cheating on standardized tests;
she concludes that "[a] few teachers who are willing to leave the classroom
and enter courtrooms would greatly improve both fields."" A project
manager at an international development consulting firm travels to
Afghanistan and Pakistan and learns, in "places where law is most fragile,"
that "the rule of law is the linchpin of a more prosperous, safe and just
world," and vows to support this goal through a legal career.12 For a legal
educator, these essays are deeply satisfying and enjoyable reading. Bright
and accomplished young adults at a moment of transition reflect on the
meaning and purpose of their lives. Formed by past experiences, they
articulate their deepest goals, hopes, and reasons for pursuing legal
education.13  In these essays, the authors begin to construct their
5 Bercot, supra note 1, at 21.
6 Id. at 21, 27-28. The motto, which is embroidered on the towel the writer cannot use,
refers to the Gospel account of Jesus washing the feet of his disciples and commanding
them to follow his example of service to others. Id. See also John 13:1-17.
Bercot, supra note 1, at 28.
8 Barrett, supra note 2, at 20, 27.
9 See id.
10 Alexa Andrade Briscoe, Student Stories, RES IPSA LOQUITUR, Spring/Summer 2012,
at 22, 28.
" Mia Carre Long, Student Stories, REs IPSA LoQurTUR, Spring/Summer 2012, at 23,
23.
12 Steven Seigel, Student Stories, REs IPSA LOQUITUR, Spring/Summer 2012, at 25, 29.
1 Put differently, experiences lead these individuals to create meaning and purpose for
their lives. This process exemplifies the central tenet of constructivism, a psychological
theory that posits that reality is created by the human person's interaction with
environmental factors. See ROBERT KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF 7-13 (1982) (discussing
(continued)
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professional identities as lawyers. These students are under no illusions
that the legal system is perfect or that it can solve every problem. Rather,
they are motivated by deeply personal goals and commitments, and they
want to use law to advance those goals, changing the law along the way if
necessary.
It is unfortunate that the law school curriculum provides so few
opportunities for students to engage in sustained reflection on their
emerging professional identities and goals. Opportunities for this kind of
reflection abound in the legal curriculum. The law is riddled with enticing
characters in morally ambiguous situations: the injured tort plaintiff; the
contracting party who must breach covenants; the landowner facing the
state's powers of eminent domain; criminal defendants facing the death
penalty; medical professionals seeking to comply with myriad safety,
financial, and privacy regulations; winners and losers under the tax code;
and so many others. Each of these archetypes, if examined in the rich
context of human experience, presents fertile ground for reflection on the
client's needs, the law's limits, and the lawyer's role; alas, this ground is
often left untilled. 14
Important recent examinations of the law school curriculum have
called attention to shortcomings in educating about the lawyer's
professional role. In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation issued the seminal
report Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law. As is
now widely known, Carnegie posits three facets of legal education: a
cognitive apprenticeship, which teaches the knowledge or "way of
thinking" in law; an apprenticeship of practical skill, which requires
students to use and apply knowledge in the context of simulated or actual
practice; and an ethical apprenticeship, which considers the ethical
constructivism generally); SHARAN B. MERRIAM ET AL., LEARNING IN ADULTHOOD 291-94
(3d ed. 2007) (describing the constructivist orientation as applied to learning). This theory
will figure prominently in the discussion that follows. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
14 See, e.g., Jane Harris Aiken, Clients as Teachers, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 81, 84
(2004) ("The case method . . . permits, perhaps requires, the student to be detached from the
people involved . . .. It is rare to see a shocked response by the class to an instance of
physical injury, or to a human tragedy of a person who has lost his liberty unjustly.").
15 See, e.g., Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (Clinical
Legal Educ. Ass'n ed., 2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAw (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; Judith
Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education's "Wicked Problems," 61 RUTGERS L. REV.
867 (2009).
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principles and public roles and responsibilities of lawyers.16 The report
views this trinity of apprenticeships as the essential elements of a legal
education.' 7
The Carnegie Report persuasively demonstrates that law schools are
very good at teaching legal doctrine and analysis. 8 Carnegie recognizes
deficiencies in law schools' attempts to teach legal skills in practical
contexts but acknowledges that progress has been made in this area, largely
through the rise of writing programs and clinical legal education.' 9 In
Carnegie's estimation, education for each student's journey of professional
identity is the most seriously shortchanged.20
Research beyond Carnegie is necessary to appreciate the
developmental complexity of law students' paths into professional life.
Achieving a mature professionalism requires that students reshape their
fundamental ways of thinking and making meaning about the world. 2 1 A
career in law requires wrestling with the ethical demands of the profession
and with conflicts between personal values, the values of clients, and
values of the legal system. Law students must recognize the multiple
pressures on lawyers as agents in the legal system. These challenges are
developmental. Entering the legal profession requires individuals to
develop new ways of understanding the world.
This Article focuses on the ways in which law-leaming is
fundamentally a process of human development that must embrace the
relationships and tensions between self, client, legal system, and society.
Though not fully considered by the Carnegie authors, this developmental
16 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-29.
17 Id. at 29.
18 Id. at 74-75 (noting that the case-dialogue method is "well suited to train students in
the analytical thinking," which will lead to success in law school and in practice).
1 Id. at 89 ("[W]e [must] consider the question of what could be done to move
education for practice into the more central position it deserves to hold within the legal
academy.").
20 See id. at 132 ("[I]n legal education today, most aspects of the ethical-social
apprenticeship are subordinate to academic training in case-dialogue method and contested
as to their value and appropriateness."). In perhaps the most memorable turn of phrase in
the report, the Carnegie authors suggest that the first year of law school and its immersion
in the case-dialogue method requires a "temporary moral lobotomy." Id. at 78.
21 When viewed through a developmental lens, psychological growth may be thought of
as "successively more complex principles for organizing experience." ROBERT KEGAN, IN
OVER OUR HEADS: THE MENTAL DEMANDs OF MODERN LIFE 29 (1994). See also infra notes
125, 127-131 and accompanying text.
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view militates in favor of Carnegie's central recommendation that students
should be asked to apply cognitive knowledge of legal doctrine in practical
contexts accompanied by mature reflection on ethics and professional
purpose. Such experiences can result in developmental changes. Knowing
the process by which this developmental change takes place will assist law
schools in designing a curriculum that supports these changes. A
developmental approach to the law curriculum requires a new paradigm
that exceeds the Carnegie recommendations. In such a revised curriculum,
students would be expected to discover and create knowledge by being
both individually and collaboratively responsible for investigation of law
and facts. Students would also write more, so that they capture their new
ways of understanding and analyzing problems. These modifications to
the curriculum would ensure that experience and reflection on experience
have a more intentional and central role in students' formation.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II lays out the experience of a
group of IL students responding to a problem-based exercise in a torts
casebook. Although the casebook problem presents a complex and rich
fact pattern, it shortchanges important questions about the lawyer's
relationship with her clients and the law, and thereby misses opportunities
for essential professional and personal development. Part III examines the
Carnegie Report and contemporary trends in legal education, noting
shortfalls that result from the lack of a developmental perspective. Part
IV.A examines social constructivism, a theory which posits that learning
the law is a process of socialization and concludes that the social view does
not leave adequate room for individuals' developmental capacities. Part
IV.B then sets out cognitive-developmental stages of adult development in
some detail with the goal of understanding the developmental demands
imposed by the professional life. Part V advocates a more
developmentally-appropriate law curriculum and suggests what some
prominent features of that curriculum might be. The central goal of these
suggestions is to educate law students to author their own experiences and
to better understand lawyers' roles within and apart from the legal system.
This developmental view of legal education aspires to form lawyers who
are more fulfilled and satisfied in their life's work, ultimately empowered
to pursue their deepest goals.
II. AN EXAMPLE
Because law-learning and law practice are deeply embedded in human
experience, a real-life example best illustrates the strengths and
shortcomings of the present legal education system. This example is
drawn from my own experience as a first-year student (some thirteen years
783
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ago) in a thirty-person, small-group torts class. Within the first month of
school, my classmates and I were assigned to consider the following
problem, drawn from a popular torts casebook:22
A potential client, Alice Trudlow, is a thirty-two-year-old
single mother of a fifteen-year-old daughter named
Samantha. Some months previously, Alice came home
unexpectedly early one evening to discover Samantha
having sex with an eighteen-year-old named William
Jennings. That evening, Samantha locked herself in her
room, and mother and daughter have never spoken about
the incident. Samantha became pregnant, but the
pregnancy was tubal and had to be surgically terminated.
Alice is concerned that Samantha would not discuss the
issue with her, and she worries that Samantha will follow
in her own footsteps as a teenaged parent. Consequently,
she asks whether prosecutors could be encouraged to
pursue a statutory rape charge against Jennings; failing
that, she wants to know whether Jennings is liable for the
tort of battery. The lawyers have interviewed Samantha
and learned that the sex was in fact consensual-a fact
which Alice does not know and which Samantha begs
them to keep confidential.23
For governing law on the battery issue, the casebook provides an
excerpt from the brief opinion in Barton v. Bee Line, Inc.24 This 1933 New
York decision held that "a female under the age of eighteen has no cause of
action [in tort] against a male with whom she willingly consorts, if she
knows the nature and quality of her act."25 To hold otherwise, said the
court, would reward "such female .. . for her indiscretion." 26 The court
refused to "'unwarily put it in the power of the female sex to become
seducers in their turn."' 2 7 Only after five pages of commentary do the
casebook authors report the obvious: this rule is "the distinct minority view
22 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 39-47 (5th ed. 1999).
2 31 Id. at 39-41.
24 Id. at 41-42 (excerpting Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284 (N.Y. App. Div.
1933)).
25 Barton, 265 N.Y.S. at 285.
26 id
2 7 Id. (quoting Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232, 240 (Conn. 1860)).
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regarding the effect of statutory rape statutes in battery cases."2 8 Armed
with these facts and this case law, the first-year law student is asked to
advise Alice about the feasibility of criminal or civil action against
Jennings.29
The professor for my first-year torts class decided to conduct an in-
class simulation of this client meeting with Alice. Two male students were
assigned to roles as lawyers, and a visitor to the class played Alice. The
simulated client meeting was awkward and uncomfortable. The student-
lawyers dealt cavalierly with the confidentiality issue. Within minutes,
they revealed to Alice that Samantha had consented to the sex with
Jennings. The student-lawyers then argued normatively in favor of the
position found in Barton, stating that because Samantha consented to the
sex, she was not wronged and should not recover. The client seemed taken
aback by her lawyers' views.
In responding to their client, these student-lawyers constructed a
simple world where the legal framework of Barton was all that mattered.
In their view, Barton was the law and was not to be questioned in any way;
any contrary views, including those of the client, were to be ignored or
opposed. The students thus avoided the hard questions of law and
ambiguities within Barton, the views of their own client and her conflict
with the law, and the deeply problematic social mores of Barton. They did
not see any room for their own personal agency within the legal system.
Mature and effective lawyering requires a more complex and nuanced way
of understanding the legal system and human experience. This in turn
requires more advanced developmental tools than these students had
available to them at that time. Developing these tools must become part of
legal education.
Achieving a more mature developmental state requires aspiring
lawyers to mediate tensions in the client relationship and tensions in the
lawyer's own relationship to the law. The Trudlow problem casts both of
these tensions in relief.
First, the problem requires the student to struggle with the nature of a
lawyer's relationship with a client. At the heart of this problem is the
question whether the lawyer should tell Alice that Samantha characterized
28 HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 47. Indeed, the seventh edition of the Henderson
casebook sharpens this point, noting parenthetically that "at the time Barton was decided it
was contrary to the contemporaneous weight of authority in New York and in other
jurisdictions and that only one case in New York has since been determined on Barton's
authority." JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 48 (7th ed. 2007).
29 Id. at 40-41.
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the sex with Jennings as consensual.30 Jennings will likely argue that the
sex was consensual; if Samantha corroborates this argument, the battery
claim could be fatally undermined. Of course, the lawyer must first face
the legal question whether she may reveal Samantha's confidences to
Alice. However, this legal issue is only the beginning. She must also
decide how to take account of nonlegal considerations such as the state of
the parent-child relationship or the needs of a fifteen-year-old child.
Moreover, even law students must be expected to appreciate that different
lawyers will view these considerations differently.
Second, the problem presents difficult issues of law. Barton is a long-
abandoned minority view for good reason. The rule and reasoning of
Barton would probably surprise most nonlawyers, as it did the actress who
30 The casebook includes notes on a number of legal issues related to this question,
including the issue of Samantha's right to confidentiality, Samantha's status as a potential
minor plaintiff in a tort suit, and the effect of the criminal statute on consent. HENDERSON,
supra note 22, at 42-47. However, by casting these issues as purely legal questions, the
book missed an opportunity to prod students to think about how these legal rules should
apply to the human clients in front of them.
3 The casebook's treatment of this issue is unsatisfactory. The initial material
following the problem and Barton case admits that "the nonlegal aspects may actually be
more difficult to resolve than the purely legal," but the surrounding discussion suggests that
the lawyer may well avoid taking the case because it "will not be a pleasant one to handle,"
and glibly reports, "[tihe reaction of many lawyers to cases of this sort is, 'I should have
gone to business school."' HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 42. The business school response
strikes me as the gendered reaction of three male casebook authors. I doubt that most of my
classmates responded to a story about a single mother concerned about the possible teenage
pregnancy of her daughter by thinking about business school. I certainly did not.
Continuing on the assumption that law students would want to avoid this case, the
casebook then quotes the Model Code of Professional Responsibility to the effect that "a
lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment" and must sometimes
"accept[] ... his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and
the bar generally." Id. at 43 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26
(1980)). It might have been more useful to point students towards the conception of a
lawyer articulated in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1: "In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012). Rather than dismissing the family conflicts at the heart of
this case as "unpleasant" or tolerating them as an "unattractive" part of the professional's
job as a lawyer, the Model Rule allows the lawyer to assist the clients in nonlegal matters-
perhaps best accomplished in this matter by pointing Alice and Samantha towards a skilled
family therapist. Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 4.
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played Alice in our class exercise. Most people understand that the crime
of statutory rape views consent as irrelevant.32 However, for the civil
claim, Barton rejects this familiar legal principle and puts consent squarely
at issue. The reasoning in Barton is even worse. The language of the
opinion embraces a thoroughly patronizing and outdated view of women.
Must a lawyer in a jurisdiction where Barton is the law accept its result and
reasoning uncritically? Can the lawyer avoid the rule of Barton without
challenging it? Or is it desirable to challenge the rule directly and perhaps
change the law? If change is not possible or advisable from the client's
perspective, how can a lawyer function within a legal system that contains
such a rule?
Mindful of the complexity of this task, Carnegie defines well the goal
of legal education: sophisticated legal practice demands that lawyers
engage in careful legal analysis of the client's positions, formulate and
communicate ideas clearly in speech and writing, and simultaneously
uphold the ethical standards of the profession while not shrinking from the
human dimensions of practice.34 This call to integrate the teaching of these
three areas is a powerful, even transformational, suggestion for legal
pedagogy. Alas, the call has largely gone unheeded."
Moreover, Carnegie does not fully recognize the developmental gains
that are necessary to achieve a mature professionalism. To advise Alice
and Samantha well and with integrity, law students must take on the
developmental position of a mature, adult, and professional lawyer. The
intricate legal and human dynamics of the Trudlow problem require
students to reflect on how lawyers think, negotiate the diversity of legal
32 SHARON G. ELSTEIN & Noy DAVIS, AM. BAR Ass'N, SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL
RESPONSES 17-20 (1997).
3 See Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
34 See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 191-92.
35 See id. There are notable exceptions. For an excellent guide for how to design and
teach a law school class, I generally recommend MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
TEACHING LAW By DESIGN (2009). The book contains useful advice rooted in sound
educational theory. Chapter 3, entitled "Designing the Course," addresses the process of
curriculum design at the course level, arguing that the first step is to set goals for the course
in terms of what the students should get out of it. Id. at 38-40. Law schools would do well
to absorb and reflect upon the authors' advice as they begin identifying and defining their
outcome goals.
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thought, and understand that legal solutions are but one tool for addressing
the human problems of Alice and Samantha.
As a prelude to designing a stronger curriculum, legal educators must
examine the research conducted by cognitive and developmental
psychologists about adult learning and lifespan development. Present
examinations of the law school curriculum have only begun to assimilate
this body of knowledge. This literature broadly supports a reformed
model of legal education that would help lawyers understand their roles
vis-A-vis clients and the legal system. A developmental approach to legal
education would shift the priority from training people to "think like
lawyers" to empowering individuals to use their full developmental
capacities to generate creative legal ideas in complex human situations.
Importantly, a developmental approach would also develop law students'
critical consciousness about the law as they seek to mediate the demands of
the applicable law, clients, the legal profession, the social good, and their
own personal commitments. In sum, law students would be empowered to
author their own experiences as agents and actors in the legal system.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE CARNEGIE CRITIQUE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Much current commentary about curriculum reform builds on the
seminal 2007 Carnegie Foundation report as its foundation. Carnegie
36 Of course, at its best, clinical legal education can teach these lessons. Indeed, there is
a robust literature arguing that experiential education generally and clinical education in
particular is essential to preparing law students to enter practice. See, e.g., Jane H. Aiken,
Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 287 (2001) ("Clinical legal education
offers students direct experience as lawyers working for social justice."); Stephen Wizner,
The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1929, 1935 (2002) (arguing that law school clinic is the primary place in law school where
students can learn about the actual functioning of the legal system, and that the clinic
experience instills in them the value and duty of public service). However, the law school
experience for most students-even those lucky enough to have access to good clinical
education-is still dominated by Socratic paradigms, and so I begin my examination here in
a torts class.
37 One education scholar has said that the relationship between student development and
the process of inquiry in different disciplines is "unexplored terrain." JANET DONALD,
LEARNING TO THINK, at xi (2002).
38 Part of Carnegie's promise lies in the respected history of the Carnegie Foundation's
interventions in American higher education. A 1910 study of medical education by
Abraham Flexner provided the blueprints for the modem system of academic and clinical
medical training that endures to this day in this country. See ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION
(continued)
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posits three apprenticeships or "facets of professional expertise" which
would-be practitioners must master.39 The first apprenticeship is
"intellectual or cognitive"; it teaches the "knowledge [or the] way of
thinking of the profession." 4 0 This lesson is pursued through the case-
dialogue method, which the report terms "the legal academy's standardized
form of the cognitive apprenticeship."41 The second apprenticeship gives
students experience in "the forms of expert practice shared by competent
practitioners" through "simulated practice situations . . . or in actual
clinical experience with real clients."42 The report observes a "wide range"
of courses geared towards this apprenticeship, including first-year legal
research and writing, trial advocacy classes, externships, and legal
clinics.43 The report also recognizes that many law schools communicate
to students that these courses are of "secondary intellectual value and
importance" by marking faculty who teach them with "lower academic
status."" Finally, an apprenticeship of "identity and purpose" attempts to
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910); DAVID THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0, at 60
(2009) (discussing the impact of the Flexner report).
Carnegie has examined legal education many times over the past 100 years. See JAMES
R. MAXEINER, EDUCATING LAWYERS Now AND THEN: AN ESSAY COMPARING THE 2007 AND
1914 CARNEGIE FOUNDATION REPORTS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, at vii-viii (2007); JOSEF
REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (1914);
THOMSON, supra, at 60-62. The 2007 Carnegie Report is the product of a respected former
law school dean, a philosopher, two psychologists, and an education scholar, drawing
together practical and theoretical knowledge from a number of places within the academy.
See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at ix-x. See id. for background on each of the
Carnegie Report's co-authors.
39 See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-28. As the report itself recognizes, the
present graduate/academic model of legal education replaced an earlier apprenticeship
model. Id. at 25. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 463-
68 (3d ed. 2005). The Carnegie Report suggests that the transition to academic legal
education has resulted in "a legacy of crossed purposes and even distrust between
practitioners and academics, as well as between the academy and the public, which still
besets the preparation of professionals." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 25. In this
context, Carnegie's decision to reclaim and reconceptualize the term "apprenticeship" may
be viewed as an effort to restore benefits lost to the hegemony of the academic model of
education. Id. at 26.
40 Id. at 28 (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).
4' Id. at 50.
42 Id. at 28 (discussed in detail in Chapter 3).
43 id
4 Id. at 87-88.
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form students' professional identity in line with the ethical values as well
as public roles and responsibilities of lawyers.45 The report views the
apprenticeship of professional identity as neglected by law schools. 46
For law, as for other professions, Carnegie identifies the "signature
pedagogy" that defines training in the discipline.4 7  "[A] signature
pedagogy is a key educational practice by which a given field creates a
common frame through which it can induct new members."" Noting that
the "bottom line" of professional education is not what students know, but
"what they can do," Carnegie asserts that "the most distinctive of the
signature pedagogies ... are pedagogical attempts to build bridges between
thought and action . .. 49 Examples include: bedside teaching in
medicine, the design and performance studios in architecture and
engineering, the preaching practicum in seminaries, and the case dialogue
method (popularly known as the Socratic method) in law.o
The central Carnegie thesis is that law schools overemphasize the
cognitive apprenticeship through practice of the case-dialogue method
while neglecting the apprenticeships of practice and professionalism."
According to Carnegie, the case-dialogue method prizes "procedural and
formal qualities of legal thinking," while shortchanging "the moral and
social dimensions" of legal problems and neglecting "fuller contexts of
4S Id. at 28.
46 Id. at 128.
47 Id. at 23.
48 Id. at 23-24, 50.
49 Id. at 23. Unfortunately, the very next sentence somewhat obscures the definition:
"These are pedagogies invented to prepare the mind for practice." Id. By using the words
"prepare the mind," the text suggests, at least in theory, that a signature pedagogy might
function adequately even if limited solely to the cognitive realm. However, none of the
examples cited-medical training at bedside, the engineering or architecture studio,
preaching class in seminaries, and supervised practice in teaching and social work-
operates by separating the knowledge base and theoretical frames of the profession from its
work in action.
50 Id. Commentators, including the present writer, have struggled to find language to
describe the present doctrinal classroom. Carnegie employs the term "case-dialogue
method" to refer to what goes on in American law classrooms today. Id. at 2-3. Professor
Mertz, in her linguistic study, similarly distinguishes "prototypical" Socratic instruction
from a "modified" method. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 44, 241
n.3 (2007). Both choices seem attempt to recognize that what goes on in American law
classrooms today is related to but must be differentiated from the archetypical Socratic
method.
5 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 29.
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actual legal practice."5 2 These characteristics of the case-dialogue method
result in "two major limitations of legal education": its "causal
attention ... to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the
complexity of actual law practice" and its inadequate "support for
developing the ethical and social dimensions of the profession."
The result is a law school experience that does not adequately support
students' move into the professional community. Carnegie recognizes that
sustained focus on the case-dialogue method over three years of legal
education results in "diminishing returns."54 Indeed, Carnegie views "the
relative marginality of clinical training in law schools" as "striking." 5
However, this marginality is not surprising but rather is a predictable
outgrowth of a signature pedagogy that operates in the cognitive domain
and largely eschews responsibility for building the bridge from thought to
practice.
From Carnegie's ambitious thesis and searching critique, one might
expect proposals that substantially revise the law school experience. To be
sure, the report proffers initial thoughts on how to structure an integrated
curriculum-one that sets the cognitive analytical study of law in practical
contexts rich with questions of ethics and professional role.57 Concurring
with Best Practices for Legal Education, the Carnegie authors assert that
52 Id. at 145.
5 Id. at 187-88. For an interesting take on other ways to educate lawyers about their
ethical responsibilities, see Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of
Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (2009) (advocating a pitfalls pedagogy, or a legal
curriculum that incorporates the perils of the legal profession as an approach to professional
responsibility to better prepare law students for the situations they will encounter in
practice).
54 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 76-77.
s Id. at 24.
56 Carnegie even seems to recognize this problem, identifying the "shadow structure,"
that is, "the absent pedagogy that is not engaged" as involving two "missing complements
to the case-dialogue method." Id. at 51, 56. These missing components are "experience
with clients" and lack of "ethical substance," loosely tracking the apprenticeships of
practice and professional identity. Id. at 56-57.
s7 Id. at 194-202. This message pervades the document. To take just one example, in
Chapter 4, entitled "Professional Identity and Purpose," the report asserts that achieving a
better balance among the cognitive, practical and ethical/professional apprenticeships
requires more than "shuffl[ing] the existing pieces." Id. at 147. Instead, legal educators
will have to engage in "careful rethinking of both the existing curriculum and the
pedagogies that law schools employ to produce a more coherent and integrated initiation
into a life in the law." Id.
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"lawyering should always be taught in conscious relationship to the
students' growing understanding of particular features and areas of legal
doctrine." 8 However, Carnegie's proffered practical solution seems
modest compared to its goal of a "reconfigured" third year experience, and
"probably some reconfiguration of the second year as well."5 9 It is
unfortunate that Carnegie misses an opportunity to advocate for a redefined
signature pedagogy that better prepares students for the challenges they
will face as lawyers.
Indeed, Carnegie seems to reflect the incremental-and ineffective-
change that is currently taking place in legal education. The case-dialogue
method continues to exert "considerable influence" over modern practice.60
58 Id at 195. See also STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 143 (explaining that the
opportunity to engage in problem-solving exercises alone is insufficient; law schools should
give students the opportunity to engage in "context-based" learning in both hypothetical and
real-life situations).
s9 Id. at 77. To be sure, the Carnegie prescriptions are ambitious in the staid world of
legal education. Even Carnegie observes that reform movements in legal education
typically result in additions to the curriculum-discrete courses or series of courses aimed
at remedying particular deficits. Id. at 76 ("[T]oday's trend is to supplement rather than
replace the inherited reliance on this venerable case-dialogue teaching in the first phase of
doctrinal instruction ... either by including other techniques, such as close reading drills, or
by the direct incorporation of legal writing into the class itself, or by changing the
pedagogical form altogether. . . ."). Indeed, the concluding chapter of the report notes that
"all law schools teach lawyering skills and professionalism, and the offerings at many are
very rich." Id. at 191. However, the present model of skills and ethics instruction in most
American law schools reflects just the kind of 'reform by addition' that Carnegie criticizes.
This is not the kind of solution Carnegie offers; it would be a defeat if the dominant law
school response was to add a Carnegie-flavored item to the present curricular smorgasbord.
See Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1063, 1085 (1986)
(employing the smorgasbord metaphor).
60 MERTZ, supra note 50, at 144. See also Laurel Currie Oates, Did Harvard Get It
Right?, 59 MERCER L. REv. 675 (2008). For general commentary about the Socratic
classroom, see LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and
Resistance to In "doctrine "ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 131 (2000); James Eager, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of
Pedagogical Methods in Legal Education, 32 GoNz. L. REv. 389 (1996-97); Lisa Eichhorn,
Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous Supplement?, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 105 (1998);
Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological
Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 91 (2000); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method
(continued)
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The modem law classroom bears surface resemblance to its pedagogical
forebears: classes are still large, and the professor's voice, through
questions and often answers, tends to dominate. However, present
pedagogical practices depart from archetypical models of the Socratic
classroom61 in a variety of ways. The goals of the archetype-the ability
to think on one's feet and to quickly perceive the intricacies and
implications of legal argument-are not fully realized chiefly because the
pressure to perform has been abated.62 Although newer techniques are
and Women Law Students: Humanize, Don't Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
37 (1997).
Many writers particularly critique the Socratic classroom's focus on appellate cases, as
so much modem law is statutory. A number of law schools, notably Harvard, have
introduced legislation-regulation courses in the first year, and a number of textbooks are
now available for these courses. E.g., LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2010).
61 See Philip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SA) (Lecture at Puget Sound 1/31/90),
109 HARv. L. REv. 911, 915 (1996) (noting that the Socratic method asks the student to
engage in the kind of analysis lawyers in practice do, to "sit under the apple tree himself-
that is, to examine directly relevant and the arguably analogous legal materials and to
reason through to a solution of the unsettled problem"); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the
Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REv. 113, 122-24 (1999) (describing
"traditionalist" Socratic professors at Harvard Law School).
62 Many professors have dropped the practice of "blind calls" and now indicate ahead of
time which students will or may be called on for a particular class. Scholars are correct to
observe that students are most successful when they participate as active learners; in the
traditional Socratic classroom, students are expected to learn either by answering the
professor's questions aloud or vicariously. E.g., Areeda, supra note 61, at 916 ("What you
[the instructor] try to do, therefore, is to induce the students you haven't called on to
participate vicariously. . . ."); Kerr, supra note 61, at 117; Michael Hunter Schwartz,
Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and
Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv 347, 351 (2001). However, announcing in
advance which students are going to be on call for a particular class robs the Socratic
method of its immediacy and impact. Students prepare very well when they are on call and
are less motivated at other times. Without reading the cases before class, students have
much more difficulty following the Socratic dialogue and formulating their own internal
answers to the questions. Thus, the purported active learning of the archetypical Socratic
classroom has given way to passive listening in the neo-Socratic classroom. This passive
listening is further exacerbated by common practices that occur when the Socratic method
is poorly executed. See Areeda, supra note 61, at 911-13 (describing the following poor
questioning techniques: "antiphonal recitation," "opinion survey," "non-followed-up vague
or big picture rambler," and "token mid-lecture pause"). Perhaps these passive classrooms
(continued)
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now sometimes used in Socratic classrooms, the goals suggested by these
techniques have not been fully understood, theorized, and articulated,
much less realized.6 3 These attempts to build bridges into practice are
quite tentative.
Newer course offerings pursue a similar path, ornamenting the Socratic
melody rather than fundamentally changing law schools' tune. Writing
courses, clinics, policy seminars, and legal philosophy courses now appear
lead to the worrisome disengagement that characterizes the second and third years of law
school. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW
SCHOOL: IN CLASS AND BEYOND, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS 14 (2011) (citations
omitted), http://ssse.iub.edu/pdf/2010/2010_LSSSEAnnualSurveyResults.pdf
("Criticisms of the traditional model highlight diminishing academic engagement in the
third year, and research confirms that academic engagement declines over the course of
students' three-year tenure in law school."). The Law School Survey of Student
Engagement (LSSSE) findings from 2009 indicate that 26% of 3Ls go to class without
having done the assigned reading, and only 54% of 3Ls spend at least twenty hours a week
reading and preparing for class. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, STUDENT
ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOL: ENHANCING STUDENT LEARNING, 2009 ANNUAL SURVEY
RESULTS 7-8 (2010), http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/LSSSEAnnualReport_2009_forWeb.pdf.
Further, 2Ls and 3Ls are much less likely than their IL counterparts to prepare multiple
drafts of a writing assignment, with the percentage of students reporting doing this very
often dropping from up to 39% (occurring at schools ranging in size from 500 to 900
students) to only 26% of 3Ls at those same schools doing the same. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY
OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT 2009, STUDENT REPONSES, ACADEMIC MOTIVATION,
http://ssse.iub.edu/pdf/2009sturesp academicmotivation.pdf. Forty-seven percent of 1Ls at
schools larger than 900 students reported never coming to class unprepared to 32% of 2Ls
and only 20% of 3Ls claimed the same. Id.
63 There is evidence that professors have begun to incorporate other techniques such as
lecture, role-playing, and problem-based approaches to their classes. Mertz recognizes that
in the eight contracts classes she studied, "[t]here was a wide variation among the eight
classes in the degree to which professors used lecture, focused Socratic dialogue, and more
diffuse styles of discursive interaction with the class." MERTZ, supra note 50, at 85.
Nonetheless, she finds an "underlying similarity: ... the same fundamental approach to
text, reading, and authority that is so clearly delineated in Socratic teaching." Id. See also
Eager, supra note 60, at 398. While these additions can be effective, they are not yet
supported by careful reflection on the goals and outcomes that they might support. Too
often, the voice of the professor still dominates in the classroom, and individual students
have little room for meaningful spoken or written participation. With few opportunities for
feedback and no evaluation or examination of the skills practiced through these classroom
techniques, there is little reason to think students will master the new skills they could
support.
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as course offerings and, in some cases, requirements. 64 More recently-
recognized trends and modifications include "(1) specialization; (2)
experiential learning; (3) globalization; (4) integration of skills-based and
doctrinal learning; (5) greater training in professionalism; and (6) enhanced
feedback."65 While each of these areas of innovation is potentially useful
and worthy of deep study, none has resulted in a comprehensive reform of
the law curriculum on the order of the reforms first implemented by
Charles Langdell in the 1870s.6 6 Instead, in the modern era, the law
curriculum has advanced in piecemeal fashion, eluding "transformative
change" of the sort suggested by the broadest readings of Carnegie.
Moreover, critiques of the Socratic method have emerged which
question whether it appropriately trains students to critique the law from a
moral and personal perspective. 8 Pierre Schlag's arresting essay, The
Anxiety of the Law Student at the Socratic Impasse, highlights what Schlag
terms the "narrowing effects" of law school. In Schlag's analysis, study
of judicial opinions leads one down a "trajectory" that is "designed not to
edify or illuminate, but to shut things down."70  In Schlag's (admittedly
pessimistic) view, law school leads the law student to ask:
6 Byse, supra note 59, at 1085 ("[T]he smorgasbord of courses-both practical and
theoretical-is far richer now than before."). No less an authority than Justice Elena Kagan
in 2007, as Dean of Harvard Law School, noted that she "was struck by the extent to which
Professor Byse anticipated the evolution of legal education at Harvard Law School and
elsewhere over the next two decades." Elena Kagan, In Memoriam: Clark Byse, 121 HARV.
L. REv. 454, 455 (2007).
65 Toni M. Fine, Reflections on U.S. Law Curricular Reform, 10 GERMAN L. J. 717, 728
(2009).
66 See Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of
Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 LAW & HisT. REv. 277 (2004).
67 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 191; Fine, supra note 65, at 723. Many reasons
for resistance to change in the legal academy have been well documented. E.g., MAXEINER,
supra note 38 (discussing the lack of reform in legal education over the last century); Fine,
supra note 65, at 728-32; Wegner, supra note 15, at 870-77 (describing reasons the legal
academy is disinclined to engage with "wicked problems," which are problems that cannot
be "definitively described or understood").
68 E.g., Pierre Schlag, The Anxiety of the Law Student at the Socratic Impasse-An
Essay on Reductionism in Legal Education, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575, 582-
83 (2007).
" Id. at 575.
70 Id at 583. Of course, Schlag's views may be empirically wrong or unduly
pessimistic. I sidestep this debate and use Schlag only as an illustration of the kinds of
mental demands Schlag believes law school should involve.
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* "Is this case correctly decided?" when she should be
asking back, "Correctly decided by reference to
what?"
* "Does this rule work?" when she should be asking
back, "Work for whom?"
* "Is this consistent with ... ?" when she should be
asking back, "What's consistency got to do with it?"
* "Which aspect or factor is predominant, primary, or
more important here?" when she should be asking
back, "How could I tell? How could you tell? How
could anyone tell?"7
Schlag's preferred questions require students to recognize the value
judgments that underlie the legal community's choices of legally
significant facts and bring their own experience to bear on legal analysis.
Learning to mediate the balance between their own values and those of the
legal system will serve students throughout their careers in law and will
give them the power to be successful lawyers whose thinking transforms
the legal system by exploring the boundaries of law and by examining the
functioning of the legal system in the face of contemporary problems.
Training students to do this requires a move beyond the case-dialogue
method as signature pedagogy. It is unfortunate that the Carnegie Report
did not push its conclusions this far.
To truly create a more effective educational experience, law schools
must engage students' developmental capacity to integrate the cognitive,
practical, and ethical dimensions of lawyering, and to cast a critical eye
over the system of law they are learning. Engaging the critical and moral
imagination of law students is the key to developing professional capacity,
ethics, and conscience. To get to this goal, a deeper understanding of
cognitive and developmental psychology is necessary. This deeper
understanding and the reforms it suggests will result in a broader, more
robust curriculum and pedagogy in law schools.
IV. PEDAGOGY AND PHILOSOPHY ROOTED IN PSYCHOLOGY
Legal education since Langdell, if not before, has been thought of as a
process of socialization.72 Social constructivism "focus[es] on the social
71 id
72 Ralph Michael Stein, The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A
History ofInsular Reaction, 57 Cmt. KENT L. REv. 429, 449-50 (1981).
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setting in which learning occurs" and encompasses the idea that individuals
learn by "engag[ing] socially in talk and activity about shared problems or
tasks."73 According to the social constructivist model, education should
teach people to participate in the discourse of their field of study.74 Much
of legal modern education pursues this goal. Part IV.A examines the work
of social constructivist theorists as they consider adult development and
adult learning and applies these theories to legal education.75 On
examination, a criticism emerges; in elevating the discourse of the
community, social constructivism does not fully credit individuals'
developmental capacity to contribute to and ultimately change the
discourse. Recent defenses of the social view have recognized this critique
and responded by suggesting different ways to conceive of an individual's
role within the discourse community.76 However, these defenses of the
social view do not fully appreciate the importance of research in human
development nor do they recognize the full developmental capabilities of
mature professionalism in individuals.
Part IV.B examines the literature of adult development and adult
learning to assess the developmental capabilities of law students.77 The
work of cognitive developmental psychologists sheds light on
developmental processes that are at play during graduate and professional
training and that continue throughout adults' lives. Adult students come to
their studies at diverse developmental stages. What psychologists term the
"self-authoring view" is the hallmark of mature professionalism and should
serve as a developmental goal for law students. Pursuing this goal will
lead educators to follow Carnegie's prescription by integrating instruction
in legal doctrine, legal skills, and professional ethics and identity.
Following this path, students will view law more critically and learn to
mediate the complex human contexts in which law is but one tool for
solving problems.
7 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 291, 297.
74 See, e.g., id. at 292 ("[The] constructivism [model] understand[s] learning to be an
active rather than passive endeavor. Consequently, learning occurs through dialogue,
collaborative learning, and cooperative learning."). See infra notes 78-108 and
accompanying text.
7s See infra notes 78-108 and accompanying text. In this discussion, I use the terms
"social constructivism" and "the social view" interchangeably.
76 See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: The View from Within,
61 MERCER L. REv. 705, 736-45 (2009).
7 See infra notes 109-208 and accompanying text.
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A. The Social Constructivist Baseline in Legal Education
Social constructivism traces its origins to the great Russian
psychologist L.S. Vygotsky, who "proposed that learning is socially
mediated through a culture's symbols and language, which are constructed
in interaction with others in the culture." 7 8  On this view, learning is
primarily a process of enculturation; from this central insight flows both an
epistemology and a pedagogy.79 As to epistemology, social constructivists
hold that "knowledge is 'constructed when individuals engage socially in
talk and activity about shared problems or tasks."'80 Because "[m]aking
meaning is .. . a dialogic process involving persons-in-
conversation, . . . learning is seen as the process by which individuals are
introduced to a culture by more skilled members."s1 For proponents of
social constructivism, instruction in these "culturally shared ways of
understanding and talking about the world and reality" is at the heart of the
teaching-learning process. 82
Constructivism became "the leading metaphor of human learning" in
the 1980s and 1990s, displacing behaviorist and information-processing
perspectives.83 The impact of constructivism on classrooms at all levels
cannot be understated. The prior behaviorist focus on education as a
process of providing information to the student led to "passive perception,
memori[z]ation, and all the mechanical learning methods in traditional
didactic lecturing." 84  Over time, behaviorism has been augmented and
78 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 292. But see Charlotte Hua Liu & Robert
Matthews, Vygotsky's Philosophy: Constructivism and Its Critics Examined, 6 INT'L EDUC.
J. 386, 387-88, 391-92 (2005) (recognizing that the social constructivist view is often said
to be derived from Vygotsky's work, but re-examining Vygotsky's views of the
individual's interactions with social contexts). See generally L.S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN
SOcIETY (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1978).
79 See Liu & Matthews, supra note 78, at 388.
80 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 291-92 (quoting Rosalind Driver et al.,
Constructing Scientific Knowledge in the Classroom, 23 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5, 7 (1994)).
81 id.
82 Id. at 292.
83 Liu & Matthews, supra note 78, at 387. This is a bit of an oversimplification. There
have been other philosophical and psychological orientations to learning, including
humanist, cognitivist , and social cognitivist perspectives. See MERRIAM ET AL., supra note
13, at 281-91, 294-97. That said, Liu and Matthews are correct to identify "oscillating
emphases" between behaviorist and constructivist poles of influence across these varied
orientations. Liu & Matthews, supra note 78, at 387.
84 Liu & Matthews, supra note 78, at 389.
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sometimes replaced by a variety of techniques that seek to create
experiences through which the learner creates meaning, including self-
directed learning, transformational learning, experiential learning, situated
cognition, and reflective practice.85 Each of these educational emphases
reflects aspects of constructivism. 86
Turning to legal education specifically, many commentators have
found deeply social qualities in the traditional Langdellian epistemology.
Professor Kerr captures a social constructivist view of epistemology when
he observes that "students who learn the law via Socratic dialogue are
likely to appreciate the social construction of law."8 In the doctrinal
classroom, the professor and students often pursue the precise content of
legal rules, the nuanced contours of legal doctrine, and lawyerly
application of law to indeterminate facts. Legal doctrine and its
application is thus constructed-and knowledge of "the law" is thus
created-in the social dialogues that take place in the classroom, at least in
the ideal form.
Legal writing faculty have also wrestled with social constructivist
notions of education. 8 Writing faculty working from a social view
"acknowledge the social contexts within which writing takes place and,
thus,... acknowledge the ways in which writing generates meanings that
are shaped and constrained by those contexts." 89 The professor guides his
or her students to enter written dialogue with the legal audience by
modeling or making transparent well-defined features of the legal
discourse community such as its unarticulated assumptions, highly
technical vocabulary, and selective emphasis on particular facts. The aim
is to "focus[ ] people's attention so that their conversation"---or written
8 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 297. Merriam's book includes material detailing
self-directed learning (chapter 5), transformational learning (chapter 5), experience and
learning (including situated cognition; chapter 5), and reflective judgment (chapter 13). See
also Kitchener et al., Development of Reflective Judgment in Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF
ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 73 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006); Kathleen Taylor,
Autonomy and Self-Directed Learning: A Developmental Journey, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT
DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 196 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006).
86 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 297.
87 See Kerr, supra note 61, at 118.
88 See, e.g., J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View,
69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994).
89 Id. at 57. See also Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two
Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 25-27 (1991) (describing
the problems with work of the "socialized writer").
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work-"increasingly occurs in the language of the community they want to
join."90
Legal epistemology in its social dimensions-both in the classroom
and in law practice-has come under increasingly close scrutiny because
the academy has begun to explicitly focus on the process by which law
students and lawyers construct knowledge. In her linguistic study,
Professor Mertz identifies a "strong resonance or linguistic fit" between the
"canonical Socratic method and legal thinking" in practice. 91 According to
Mertz, the language of law school and of law practice reflects "a core
[legal] approach to the world and to human conflict" that focuses on "form,
authority, and legal-linguistic contexts."92 Through deeply social means,
this worldview is imparted in the law classroom, resulting in a
"reorientation" of the student view to a legally-filtered analysis of
conflicting claims of right and claims of moral value.93
As a result, the stakes in the law classroom are high. If one agrees
with the notion that legal language "is highly technical but nevertheless
necessary and appropriate to express a specific legal relation,"94 then the
90 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 288. The social view of legal epistemology has important
implications for pedagogy. Social constructivist oriented law teachers view novices in the
legal community as being neither poor thinkers and writers generally; rather, they are "pre-
socialized," or not yet fully aware of the community's discourse conventions. Williams,
supra note 89, at 24-25 (documenting many characteristics of pre-socialized writers). See
also MERTZ, supra note 50, at 43-83 (documenting many features of the legal discourse
community). Thus, for example, a 1 L memo that (typically) quotes the law excessively and
fails to analyze relevant facts from the assigned pattern does not reveal a generalized
weakness in analytical ability. Rather, as Williams puts it, the novice writer unfamiliar with
the community's expectations for legal analysis tends focus on the concreteness of what
courts have said at the expense of deep legal analysis of the client's facts. Williams, supra
note 89, at 19-20. Pre-socialized novices develop through the "socialized" and "post-
socialized" stages. Id. at 25-30. People who are socialized can comfortably use the
community's discourse conventions to communicate effectively with other members of the
community. In effect, they become lawyers who can talk to other lawyers. People who are
post-socialized can "retranslate" the complex ideas embodied in the conventions of the
discourse community into terms that a nonlegally-trained person can understand. Id. at 28.
9 MERTZ, supra note 50, at 28.92 Id at 4.
9 Id. at 4-6. Mertz concludes that legal education and the law reinforce a dominant
"capitalist epistemology" without adequate attention to "hidden exclusions that are created
by subtle cultural invisibility and cultural dominance." Id. at 208.
94 Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and Dangers, 49 MERCER L.
REv. 709, 712 (1998). Professor Litowitz rejects both excessive legalese and entirely plain
(continued)
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law classroom gives people the keys to the (legal) kingdom-that is, the
ability to use legal language and manipulate the layers of authority and
legal categories. Mertz's work suggests that the way students are taught to
identify, analyze, and solve problems in the law classroom can deeply
influence their approach to problems as lawyers.95 This has powerful
implications; Mertz's call for law schools to attend better to invisible and
excluded populations as well as for law students to retain their moral
imaginations and ethical sensibilities even during legal training may well
lead to future rethinking of the law's most fundamental approaches to
problems. While not necessarily determinative, the law school
experience is formative for many lawyers and thus, is capable of shaping
the profession's approach to clients and their problems.
It is not convincing, however, that a richer, more critical legal
discourse can be achieved if the orientation towards legal education
remains primarily social. The social-constructivist stance can lead to its
own kind of rigidity that can rob the learner of intellectual autonomy
through several inherent risks and shortcomings. First, a focus on the
discourse of the target community neglects to consider that the discourse
itself, particularly near its boundaries, is not static and easily definable.
One need look no further than the recent controversy over the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act to see that arguments once considered
frivolous can quickly become widely accepted or even the law. Second,
English as appropriate modes of legal communication. See id. at 711. However, his paper
also acknowledges that the specialized, technical discourse he envisions presents dangers to
society at large. Id.
9s See MERTZ, supra note 50, at 12-13.
96 See id. at 4, 218-19, 223.
97 See id. at 115 ("[A] legal reading has room for almost any facet of social context or
identity-but at the margins."); Schlag, supra note 68, at 575 ("Law school teaching has a
pervasive centralizing, homogenizing tendency ... I will call it centrism .... Centrism
celebrates moderation, reasonableness, good judgment, avoidance of extremes, following
the norm, judicial minimalism, the passive virtues, balancing, and the middle of the bell
curve.").
98 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-93 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (holding that the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, forming a
majority by being in accordance with the four justices who filed the joint dissent); Mark A.
Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1825,
1825-27 (2011) (explaining that most legislators and scholars had "good reason" to be
confident of the individual mandate's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause at the
time the legislation was passed).
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the journey into the target community and experiences in that community
may differ markedly for persons of different backgrounds, particularly
women, racial minorities, and people of diverse sexual orientations."9 As
the legal community becomes less homogenous, it is more difficult to
identify features of the discourse that are shared by its diverse members or
that reflect the dreams and aspirations of those members. Finally, even
newcomers to the legal community have the power to make contributions
that fundamentally change the discourse.o00
Professors Rideout and Ramsfield recognize the power of these
critiques and attribute shortcomings in the social view to flaws in the
"professor's stance."' 0 ' If a social view is used "as a tool for indoctrination
only, for acculturation only, or for a thinly guised return to formalism," the
professors posit, "the subtleties and strengths of the view are lost," and
"professors may have let community trump critical thinking, discourse
drum out dialogue, and context coerce creativity."l 0 2
To remedy this situation, Rideout and Ramsfield extend their social
view to cover aspects of identity that they consider most salient to learning
to write like a lawyer.10 3 Drawing primarily on the work of "new literacy"
researcher Roz Ivanic,'0 they suggest that legal writing teachers focus on
the "discoursal self," which is "that part of a legal writer's identity
9 See generally MERTZ, supra note 50. As usual, Mertz is sensitive to the results of the
legal community's tendency to discount the effects of differences such as gender, race, or
sexual orientation. She characterizes legal language as taught in U.S. classrooms as having
a "double edge." Id. at 133. Legal readings of conflicts which ignore or marginalize social,
cultural, and contextual differences can offer a "liberating" egalitarian quality to conflict
resolution, but at the same time these readings can also "conceal the ways that law
participates in and supports unjust aspects of capitalist societies." Id at 133-34. She
explains: "As Matoesian[] has noted, domination is well concealed and indeed naturalized
through metalinguistic ideology and structure in legal settings, and the law school
classroom offers a prism through which to see this process in action." Id. at 134 (citing
GREGORY M. MATOESAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY 37-68 (2001)).
' See KEGAN, supra note 21, at 287-92 (arguing that the social constructivist view of
education can underestimate the psychological and developmental independence of
individual learners); id. at 303 (noting that a goal of education should be that the students
will see themselves "as the co-creators of the culture" as opposed to culture merely shaping
them.
101 Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 76, at 711.
10 2 Id. at 711, 714.
10 3 Id. at 744.
104 See id. at 723-24, 728-36.
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'constructed' by legal writing itself." 05 Constructing this identity, for
Rideout and Ramsfield, is "much more than simply taking on a role. It is
taking on a different identity, one inscribed with ways of understanding the
world that are constrained by the positions and possibilities available
within the discourse of the law . . . [it is] changing as a person."106
To be sure, Rideout and Ramsfield reject the view that the legal
community creates "discoursal identity" in law students in a deterministic
manner, and they recognize that entering the community can create conflict
for individuals who resist its norms or conventions.10 ' However, the role
of community is still paramount in their view. Because their view
valorizes social contributions to the formation of a discoursal identity, they
view the matter of change in the legal discourse as "difficult."' 0 Rideout
and Ramsfield's contribution illuminates the multidimensional processes
by which law students become socialized legal writers. Nonetheless, a
richer view that would also credit their individual cognitive development is
needed.
B. Beyond the Social: Appreciating the Complexity ofIndividual
Development
Only recently have scholars begun to understand that the deep
connections between learning and development that characterize childhood
are also at work in the lives of adults.109 Indeed, both adult development
and adult learning are relatively young fields of study.1 o Prior to 1978, the
term "adult development" was not used as a subject heading in
Psychological Abstracts, the most important print source collecting
research in the field of psychology."' Likewise, only in 1968 did Malcolm
Knowles publish his theory of andragogy, which differentiated learning in
adulthood from learning in childhood and used basic assumptions about
how adults learn to propose practices that guided adult education for a
1o5 Id. at 737. The discoursal identity is distinguished from other aspects of identity,
most importantly the "autobiographical self," i.e., the "self' that most people think about
when they refer to themselves. Id at 735-36.
'
0 Id. at 737.
107 See id. at 742.
s1d. at 741-42.
109 Carol Hoare, Growing a Discipline at the Borders of Thought, in HANDBOOK OF
ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 3, 3 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006).
oId. at 3-4.
'" Id. at 3. Psychological Abstracts ceased print publication in 2006; the online
resource PsyclNFO is presently the most useful digest of psychological scholarship.
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generation.1 2 One of the reasons that connections between adult learning
and development have not been probed more deeply is that they reside in
two different and non-integrated subfields: adult learning is studied as part
of the discipline of educational psychology and adult education, while
adult development is located within psychological theory and research." 3
Integrating the accumulated knowledge about adult development and
learning is key to rebuilding the professional curriculum.
Much of the most useful knowledge about human development takes
as its starting point Jean Piaget's model of cognitive development in
children.'14 Piaget's work has been expanded and extended into adulthood
by Professor Robert Kegan of the Harvard Graduate School of
Education. " As we look for connections between development and
learning, the cognitive-developmental perspective of Kegan and his
followers offers a rich and flexible model that can help legal educators
better understand the cognitive, moral, and personal journey that
characterizes entry into the legal community.
There are two primary reasons that the cognitive-developmental model
is helpful. First, Kegan, like many contemporary psychologists, believes
that developmental growth and change processes continue throughout
adulthood."'6  For Piaget, mature adult thought emerges in late
adolescence, and this manner of thinking remains static throughout
adulthood.' '7 Kegan sees distinct stages of development in the lives of
112 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 84-87.
13Id.
114 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 26 ("We begin the journey toward a new understanding of
the development of the person with Piaget ... because in Piaget I believe we discover a
genius who exceeded himself and found more than he was looking for.").
115 See generally KEGAN, supra note 21; KEGAN, supra note 13. I am aware of the
raging debates in the psychology literature regarding the matters I write about. For
instance, scholars find support for a variety of views about whether development in
adulthood proceeds in cumulative, hierarchical stages, or whether development occurs
consistently across domains (e.g., cognitive, moral, interpersonal, and intrapersonal). See
Charles N. Alexander et al., Introduction: Major Issues in the Exploration ofAdult Growth,
in HIGHER STAGES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 3 (Charles N. Alexander & Ellen J. Langer
eds., 1990). However, the purpose of the present paper is not to attempt to resolve, or even
to survey the literature, of these debates. Instead, I have selected the developmental model
that seems to provide the most fruitful path for legal educators at this stage in our reflection
on our students' experiences.
116 See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
117 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
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adults as people balance and rebalance increasing demands of work,
family, and community." Second, Kegan expands the developmental
focus beyond the cognitive domain and into moral, social, and
intrapersonal realms."' As a result, Kegan's perspective is particularly
helpful for understanding how to equip lawyers with the knowledge and
skill they need while forming mature professional identity and a critical
sensibility that allows them to mediate tensions between legal and nonlegal
concerns.
1. The Constructive-Developmental Perspective: Essential to
Understanding the Lives ofLawyers and Law Students
The constructive-developmental model merges two perspectives from
the psychology literature. 120 First, it draws on the constructivist notion that
"people actively construct, or make sense of, their experiences (that is,
reality)."l 2 1 Second, it appreciates the significance of developmentalism,
"which proposes that the ways in which people make meaning (that is,
their constructions of reality) can develop over time according to regular
principles of stability and change."l22
As previously noted, constructive-developmental perspectives on
adulthood grow out of the work of the renowned Swiss philosopher and
psychologist Jean Piaget.123 Piaget's research centered on the study of
development in children; nonetheless, his work "has provided the
foundation for work with adults." 2 4
Piaget's model is built around four stages of development. Each stage
represents a "qualitatively different way[] of making sense, understanding,
and constructing a knowledge of the world." 25 A "qualitatively" different
way of constructing knowledge contrasts with a quantitative increase in
knowledge. A quantitative change in knowledge refers to the
accumulation of more knowledge (data) in an individual.12 6 Qualitative
18 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 179-81.
119 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
120 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 8-13.
121 ELEANOR DRAGO-SEVERSON, BECOMING ADULT LEARNERS: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT 20 (2004) (citing KEGAN, supra note 13, at 8).
122 Id. (citing KEGAN, supra note 13, at 8).
123 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 4.
124 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
125 Id. See also Alexander et al., supra note 115, at 4.
126 See Hoare, supra note 109, at 9.
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difference, on the other hand, refers to alterations in epistemology.12 7
Stated differently, qualitative changes result in new and more complex
abilities to contextualize and understand knowledge and experience, that is,
new mental containers or structures for knowledge.128  Writing in a
Piagetian vein about adult development, one writer described qualitative
change as resulting from "alterations in human functioning and in ways of
seeing and interpreting oneself in the world."l 29  Of course, individual
adults vary widely along their path of development based on internal and
external factors, including "contexts, experiences, intentional choices, and
inclinations."o
Piaget's stages proceed through childhood and adolescence in lockstep
fashion; the final stage, "formal operational," is reached between ages
fifteen and twenty.' 3 ' Formal operational thought is characterized by the
"capacity to think hypothetically about the 'possible[,'] that is, to think in
abstract terms." 32 This way of thinking is the basis of logical, scientific
thought and permits a person to understand abstract principles such as
justice, ethics, and moral philosophy, which are part of the social order. 33
Piaget's theory does not extend beyond formal operations. For him, formal
operations represent "the apex of mature adult thought." 34  While
individuals may learn to reason abstractly in a more competent way and
may accumulate more knowledge to apply these abstract reasoning powers
across a broader spectrum,13 Piaget's theory does not allow for a more
complex way of making meaning in the world.
127 See MARK TENNANT, PSYCHOLOGY AND ADULT LEARNING 59-60 (2006); Hoare,
supra note 109, at 9; Sharan B. Merriam & M. Carolyn Clark, Learning and Development:
The Connection in Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 27,
32 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006).
128 See MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
129 Hoare, supra note 109, at 8-9.
130 Id. at 9. Kegan refers to a "zone of mediation where meaning is made," which is the
space between an event and an individual's reaction to it, where the event is "privately
composed, [and] made sense of." KEGAN, supra note 13, at 2.
131 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326. See also KEGAN, supra note 13, at 37.
132 TENNANT, supra note 127, at 61. See also KEGAN, supra note 13, at 38.
133 TENNANT, supra note 127, at 61.
13 4 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
135 See Alexander et at., supra note 115, at 4-5.
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Like many other developmental psychologists, Kegan expands Piaget
beyond the formal operational stage.136  In the classical Piagetian
framework, most students arrive at law school in the same stage of
development as when they were in approximately eleventh grade."'
Unlike Piaget, Kegan views development as continuing beyond childhood
and adolescence and into adulthood.'3 8 This permits Kegan to see subtle
differences as people grow into adult, career-oriented professionals.
Law teachers will likely find that Kegan's model explains what they
intuitively know to be true. Many professors of first-year law students
work to distinguish the mental tasks of law school from the mental tasks of
undergraduate education. 13 9  They rightly expect elevated levels of
competence and professionalism from first-year law students. It may be
less obvious that these expectations require most students to effect a
developmental change in the way they categorize, interpret, understand,
and reason. Along with a new field of study comes a new way of thinking,
a new path, and a new stage of development.
Kegan develops and expands Piaget's approach in a second way by
applying it "beyond thinking to affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal
realms." 40 While Piaget concerned himself with the processes of logical
136 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 329-40 (summarizing the adult development
theories of William Perry, King, and Kitchener (the Reflective Judgment Model), Belenky
et al. (Women's Ways of Knowing study), and Marcia Baxter Magolda (the
Epistemological Reflection Model)); Alexander et al., supra note 115, at 28 tbl.1.3
(charting stages of adult development beyond formal operations proposed by theorists
including Carol Gilligan, Kurt Fischer, Kegan, and Lawrence Kohlberg, among others);
Taylor, supra note 85, at 202 (comparing the models of Perry, Kegan, and Belenky et al.).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 170-71
(1984) (describing moral development throughout adulthood); Kurt W. Fischer & Thomas
R. Bidell, Dynamic Development of Psychological Structures in Action and Thought, in 1
HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 467, 539 (5th ed. 1998); Howard Gardner et al., The
Roots of Adult Creativity in Children's Symbolic Products, in HIGHER STAGES OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 79, 93 (Charles N. Alexander & Ellen J. Langer eds., 1990) (describing
preconventional, conventional, and post conventional 'stages' of creative development).
1 See MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
138 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 86-87, 108; KEGAN, supra note 21, at 29. See also
DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 20-21 ("The first premise [of constructive-
developmental theory] is that growth and development are lifelong processes; they do not
end in late adolescence, but continue throughout our lives.").
139 See generally Schlag, supra note 68.
140 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 20 ("Constructive-developmental theory
attends to the ways in which people make sense of their experiences with respect to
(continued)
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reasoning,14' Kegan also explores the development of an individual in
relation to herself and to those around her. 142
This expansion is also useful to law professors; the practice of law
surely includes cognitive reasoning, but also it includes interpersonal,
intrapersonal, and affective or emotional dimensions. For instance, a
lawyer functions in the interpersonal realm upon interacting with clients,
other lawyers, and judges, then formulating a position after considering
what the others have said or are likely to say. Further, a lawyer also
mediates an intrapersonal and affective discourse between her own view of
a case and the view she will take on as a lawyer, an advocate, an agent of
her principal, the client. At times, a lawyer's view of a client's legal
position or prior experience in litigating another case will conflict with a
lawyer's sense of justice. This conflict requires the lawyer to resolve
complex questions of role and responsibility that can significantly impact
one's feelings and emotions.
Constructive-developmentalists observe these powerful and
increasingly complex demands modem life makes of adults: the workplace
cognitive, intrapersonal (the self's relationship to itself), and interpersonal lines of
development."); KEGAN, supra note 21, at 29. While Kegan's approach is uniquely
beneficial to law teachers, he is not alone in looking to expand Piagetian approaches to
development beyond the cognitive domain. Howard Gardner may be the most popularly
known example. Gardner famously found "increasing evidence to suggest that intellect is
better thought of as composed of a variety of domains, including not only logical-
mathematical thought and linguistic knowledge, but also such relatively unstructured forms
as visual-spatial thinking, bodily-kinesthetic activity, musical knowledge, and even various
forms of social understanding." Gardner et al., supra note 136, at 81. Gardner has
articulated these thoughts in various forms as the Theory of Multiple Intelligences. In my
view, this theory is of most value when applied to education of younger students.
For law professors, models which focus on moral reasoning and judgment have a
particular salience. For this reason, a number of legal scholars have focused on the
Reflective Judgment Model (RJM) articulated by Karen Kitchener and Patricia King. See,
e.g., Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REv.
623, 624 (2003) (presenting a "synthesized model of the process through which clinical
students bring together the necessary components to build reflective judgment"); Wegner,
supra note 15, at 902-03 ("The 'reflective judgment' model .. . is of particular
relevance. . . ."). It is noteworthy to me that Kitchener and King themselves consider there
to be "value [in] situating the RJM within an integrated approach to development," and
choose to situate the RJM within the cognitive-developmental work of Professor Kegan.
Kitchener et al., supra note 84, at 93-94.
141 See MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 326.
142 Kitchener et al., supra note 84, at 93.
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requires more complex skills and self-directed approaches to problems,
expectations surrounding family relationships have changed, and factors
such as increasing diversity in neighborhood, school, and workplace
communities require increased understanding of culturally different ideas
and practices.143 To meet what Kegan terms "[t]he [m]ental [d]emands of
[m]odern [1]ife,"'" he posits five orders of consciousness, or ways of
constructing reality. 145 They may be stated as follows:
143 Taylor, supra note 85, at 201-03 (noting demands of contemporary society and
terming them "demonstrably more complex than those faced by most in our parents' and
grandparents' generations"). While I see kernels of truth in that statement, I have not seen
sufficient evidence to be totally convinced by it. It seems to me that the major conflicts of
generations past: World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Civil Rights Movement placed
powerful demands on adults at those times. I am as yet unwilling to say that the present
changes in culture and society exceed the demands on prior generations, although they
clearly implicate different issues and occur in a quite different and less stable economic
context. For a catalogue of the demands placed on individuals by modern roles as parents,
intimate partners, workers, and citizens, see KEGAN, supra note 21, at 302-03.
'" KEGAN, supra note 21 (subtitle of the work).
145 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 86-87 (charting six stages, including Stage 0, a position of
infancy).
While not central to my thesis, a few words about the mechanism of change between
these "orders of consciousness" might be helpful. Kegan's description of these stages
grows out of Piaget's concept of "equilibrium," in which an individual's cognitive system
seeks an "active state of balance" with the demands of her environment. See Alexander et
al., supra note 115, at 6. In the Piagetian frame, the individual "actively incorporates
features of the external world" into existing structures through the process of
"assimilation." Id. When conflict between an individual's existing structures and her
environment becomes too great, the structures themselves change to "accommodate" to the
environment, and a new cognitive equilibrium is reached. Id. See also KEGAN, supra note
21, at 39, 43-44.
Kegan conceives of changes between the orders of consciousness in terms of the
subject-object balance. DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 17, 21. To simplify a
complex point, the individual is "subject to" epistemologies that she is "embedded in" or
"identified with." Id. at 21. These epistemologies are "invisible" to the person; they cannot
be held apart and subjected to critical examination. Taylor, supra note 85, at 203. Only
when these ways of knowing are differentiated from the individual do they become
"object," which can be "examined, controlled, manipulated, or in some way acted upon."
DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 21. This process of differentiation and integration
permits individuals to formulate increasingly complex ways of making meaning in the
world. KEGAN, supra note 13, at 77; KEGAN, supra note 21, at 326.
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* First order: impulsive
* Second order: instrumental
* Third order: socializing
* Fourth order: self-authoring
* Fifth order: self-transformingl46
The first order of consciousness, termed "impulsive," is a position of
childhood, and the final stage, termed "interindividual" or "self-
transforming" is mostly theoretical and ordinarily reached only after
midlife, if at all.14 7
For law professors, the second, third, and fourth orders of
consciousness have the greatest power and promise to help understand
students' journeys. The paragraphs following describe the principal
features of the second, third, and fourth orders of consciousness and
describe important features of learners within each order. The orders of
consciousness, like the phenomena they attempt to describe, are subtle,
complex, and nuanced. While this account hopefully does justice to the
research and thinking that supports the orders, its purpose is to better
understand the developmental path of lawyers-in-training. Accordingly,
the view of the orders described in this Article is not complete. At each
stage, this discussion emphasizes features of development and related
characteristics of learning that have implications for legal education, and
the discussion omits other characteristics that seem to have less clear
application.
I am also mindful of the old axiom that "the eye cannot see itself."l 48
Psychologists have observed "that stages of development beyond one's
146 Taylor, supra note 85, at 203 (describing Kegan's five orders of consciousness). See
also KEGAN, supra note 13, at 86-87; KEGAN, supra note 21, at 314-15.
147 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 23; Taylor, supra note 85, at 203. In focusing
attention on the second, third, and fourth orders, I am following a path well-traveled by
these scholars. Further, Kegan reports results of thirteen empirical studies involving 320
discrete subjects ranging in age from twenty-five to sixty-six years old which find no
individual subject functioning fully at the fifth order of consciousness and only some 6.7%
of subjects transitioning from fourth to fifth order. KEGAN, supra note 21, at 192-95.
148 The classical Greek philosopher Socrates once coined this phrase to describe by
analogy the difficulty of knowing oneself MARK J. LUTZ, SoCRATEs' EDUCATION TO
VIRTUE 124 (1998).
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own are difficult to fully comprehend and describe." 49 Indeed, upon deep
reflection, I can identify characteristics of the second, third, and fourth
orders of consciousness as I make sense of my own sometimes-conflicting
roles as lawyer, professor, husband, son, and father. At times, my own
developmental characteristics may impede my ability to write clearly about
these epistemologies. However, I believe that the privileged position of
law teacher requires me to confront and resist limitations that come from
within as I explore the paths we have set for our students.
2. The Second Order of Consciousness: The Instrumental Way of
Knowing
The second order of consciousness emerges in childhood and has
mostly been transformed into the third order by age twenty. 50
Nonetheless, studies have shown that just over 10% of adults (including
adults of graduate student age) remain in the second order or are in the
process of transforming from second to third order.'5' Although most
incoming law students have passed beyond second order thinking, at least
some law students will begin their studies at this order of consciousness,
and law teachers see this stage in a minority of students in the classroom.
The main cognitive characteristic of the second order of consciousness
is the ability to see a reality beyond one's own perception or vantage
point.5 To take a very concrete example, a person functioning at the
second order who is flying on an airplane might observe that buildings
look very small from that vantage point, but this person realizes that the
buildings are not actually small. 5 3 Because of this ability, individuals at
the second order can construct narratives of events, understand cause and
effect, and create fixed mental categories and classes in which things and
people can be placed.154
Parents of children have likely experienced one of the hallmarks of
second order reasoning: when asked what a story or movie is about, the
149 Preface to HIGHER STAGES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, at v (Charles N. Alexander &
Ellen J. Langer eds., 1990).
150 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 30-31, 37.
' See id. at 192-95. As the following discussion will demonstrate, aspects of second
order thinking may be more common that this statistic would suggest. See infra notes 163-
164 and accompanying text.
152 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 23; KEGAN, supra note 21, at 30.
1 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 23.
IS4 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 30.
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child launches into a detailed marathon retelling of the plot.'55 Individuals
at the second order are not yet capable of abstracting a theme, such as "it's
a coming of age story" or "it's about the struggle to do the right thing."
Instead, the individual at the second order stays rooted in the concrete
chain of events that make up the plot.
In the realm of interpersonal and intrapersonal understandings,
individuals at the second order can control their impulses and needs."'
Consequently, second-order individuals have a more fixed concept of
"self," marked largely by concrete attributes and behaviors such as "one's
physical characteristics, one's concrete likes and dislikes, the kind of job
one has, the kind of car one drives."' 57 On this view, others have desires,
beliefs, and feelings, but others are primarily viewed as "pathways or
obstacles to getting one's concrete needs met."' 58
Learners at the second order of consciousness have what might be
termed an "instrumental" way of knowing.' 59 Knowledge (or an advanced
degree or certificate) is approached in a "utilitarian" way as something to
be obtained for its results, such as a raise or a promotion.160 At the second
order, individuals look to external authorities-whether professors or
texts-as sources of knowledge, are "intently focused on doing things
'right[,]' and expect to be told with great specificity what that entails."' 6'
This approach to knowledge and authority is more common than one might
imagine. In fact, one study suggests that 68% of students enter university
study "in a stage of absolute knowing, considering knowledge to be certain
or absolute and conceiving their role as learners to be limited to obtaining
knowledge from the instructor." 62
Although few adult students function fully within the second order of
consciousness, I can generate examples of second-order-type thinking in
1 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 33 (introducing this example).
156 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 89.
15 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 24 (citing ROBERT KEGAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF ADULT LEARNING & LITERACY, TOWARD A NEW PLURALISM IN
ABE/ESOL CLASSROOMS: TEACHING TO MULTIPLE "CULTURES OF MIND" 55 (2001),
available at http://www.ncsall.net/index.php@id=29.html).
158 Id. See also Taylor, supra note 85, at 204.
'
59 See DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 23.
160 Taylor, supra note 85, at 203.
161 Id. at 203, 208.
162 DONALD, supra note 37, at 3 (citing MARCIA B. BAXTER MAGOLDA, KNOWING AND
REASONING IN COLLEGE: GENDER-RELATED PATTERNS IN STUDENTS' INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT 70 (1992)).
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my own history and in the thinking of my law students. In fact, I recall a
time in my adult life when I viewed learning in almost exclusively
instrumental terms. Prior to attending law school, while in my twenties, I
was a public school teacher. I obtained some thirty graduate credits
beyond a master's degree largely because of the increases in salary that
came with greater levels of training. I selected several courses purely
because they were inexpensive and not burdensome. My purpose was to
earn credits each year so that I would get the "lane change" raises that were
a feature of our compensation scheme at that time. I wanted to do what I
had to do to get the raise and precious little more. 16 3
As a law teacher, I have seen second-order-type thinking in a few of
my students. In my legal research and writing class, I prod my students to
reflect on challenges that come with the lawyer's role as they arise. One
spring, I asked my students to draft an appellate brief in a case involving
issues of constitutional criminal procedure. I assigned students to the role
of either prosecutor or defense attorney, giving them no choice over which
side they would represent. Later in the semester, I asked them to consider
whether the role and responsibilities I had assigned conflicted with their
sense of what a just outcome would be in the criminal case. Many students
distinguished the defendant's substantive guilt or innocence from his
procedural rights and further distinguished their responsibilities to their
client from their personal beliefs. Others reflected more broadly on their
aspirations as lawyers and considered how a career in criminal law might
serve those aspirations. One student raised his hand and said, "Look, I'm
here because I want a job. I was a literature major and couldn't find
employment that paid well. So I'm here. I don't particularly want to save
the world or pursue an agenda." That student articulated well the
instrumental view of education found at the second order-education as a
means of entry to a career. Indeed, part of our role as legal educators is
professional training-law school, after all, is the gateway for entrance into
practice, and we must support our students in this goal. However, the
demands of modern law practice and the moral conflicts they engender are
more complex, and we must also support our students in their efforts to
face these more complicated demands.
163 In fact, I remember experiencing cognitive dissonance in talking to an older, wiser
colleague who reported that she did not care whether she got a raise, but was only interested
in taking courses that would benefit her teaching.
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3. The Third Order of Consciousness: The Socializing Way of
Knowing
The third order of consciousness, growing from Piaget's concept of
"formal operations," has been termed "cross-categorical knowing" or the
"socializing way of knowing."'" This stage emerges in late adolescence or
early adulthood for most people.16 5 Research has shown that most adults in
Western societies exhibit at least some features of third order
epistemology.' 66
In the cognitive realm, third-order thinkers generally move from
interacting with the concrete world around them to being more comfortable
with abstractions.'6 ' This kind of thinking will be familiar to law teachers:
a thinker at the third order "can start right in at the theoretical." She can
"ponder about situations contrary to fact; accept assumptions for the sake
of argument; make hypotheses that can be expressed in terms of
propositions and tested; ... invent imaginary systems; . . . and reflect on
her thinking in order to provide logical justifications." 69
These mental capacities are required by the law curriculum. As
students learn the legal system, they ponder contrary-to-fact hypotheticals,
accept unstated assumptions, use technical language to analyze human
experience, and learn to selectively focus on facts the legal system deems
to be significant. Further, students may make use of assumptions and
contrary-to-fact reasoning to understand how to analyze or argue a given
issue. In addition, students learn to reflect on the reasoning they read in
legal opinions, and hopefully, to reflect on the quality of their own
reasoning to strengthen it.
The cognitive capacities that emerge in the third order allow social
identity to move to the fore. Kegan characterizes the third order as "cross-
categorical"; the self is no longer the only "set or category" (as in the more
concrete second order), but a person can instead "experience the self in
relation to a ... set or category."o7 0  In relating to other people, an
individual at the third order can internalize both the individual's own
164 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 29-31, 37 (third order emerges between the ages of twelve
and twenty in most cases); DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 25.
165 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 29-31, 37.
166 See Taylor, supra note 84, at 204.
167 id.
168 KEGAN, supra note 13, at 38.
169 id.
170 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 27.
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viewpoint and that of another person, and can make self-reflective
decisions based on the interaction of these viewpoints.' 7' As a result,
people at the third order can "subordinate their needs and desires to the
needs and desires of other people."l7 2 Relatedly, a student functioning at
the third order can learn the "values, opinions, hypotheses, inferences,
[and] generalizations" of a group of people or of a discipline; she may even
be able to "bring[] [her] own values, opinions, and inferences[] into
conversation with those" of the discipline.173  The net result of these
transformations in epistemology at the third order is that the self becomes
"identified with, or made up by, its relationship to other people (family,
important friends, supervisors, or colleagues) or ideas (religious, political,
or philosophical ideologies)." 7 4 At the third order, membership in and
identification as part of the group is a primary motivator.17 5
As learners, individuals at the third order value acceptance and
approval; education is pursued to "meet the goals and expectations of
external authorities . . . and/or valued others." 7 6 Knowledge, on this view,
is still the property of authorities. 17 7 As a result, individuals at the third
order sometimes conclude that the thoughts and feelings they should have
are the thoughts and feelings they do indeed have.' 78  Because of this
tendency, individuals at the third order are "vulnerable" to the critiques of
171 Id. at 28, 30-31. Understanding the third order of consciousness can help
understand behavior that departs from societal norms. As an example, Kegan notes that
adolescents who engage in high-risk behavior are often not merely exhibiting poor "impulse
control." Id. at 27. Rather, they have not yet reached the third order of consciousness.
Instead, they can only see "the short-term, immediate present-a present lacking a live
relation to the longer-term future." Id. at 28. That is, they are unable to subordinate their
own present sensations to the values of others (such as their parents, teachers, or culture) or
to their own longer-term aspirations. Id.
172 DRAGo-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 25. This ability leads to the emergence of
empathy. Taylor, supra note 85, at 204.
173 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 286.
174 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 25.
1s At my college graduation, the president of the university captured well the
achievement of the third order when he used the ancient formulation of welcoming us
newly-minted college graduates "to the company of educated men and women."
176 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 33; Taylor, supra note 85, at 204.
'7 See DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 33.
178 Caroline L. Bassett, Laughing at Gilded Butterflies: Integrating Wisdom,
Development, and Learning, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 281,
301 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006) (citing KEGAN, supra note 21, at 275).
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their teachers.179 Critical feedback can be perceived as commentary on a
student's "essential worthiness" as a member of the group rather than as
suggestion for improvement. 8 0
Law teachers likely recognize the third order in their midst. At the
third order, law students and lawyers integrate the legal system's values
with their own, but they cannot yet take perspective on these values or
deploy them volitionally and selectively. These are the first-year law
students who apply legal reasoning in all areas of their life. They ask
pointed and lawyerly questions about course assignments and
requirements, and they test the patience of their families and loved ones by
engaging in lawyerly analysis of personal decisions.
In the view of Kegan and others, the mastery of a discipline enabled by
the third order is not adequate to meet the "hidden curriculum" of modern
life which places demands on students both in and out of school and on
adults in both the public and private spheres of their lives. 8' At the third
order, one cannot "see that the discipline is itself a method, procedure, or
system of interpretation for reflecting on hypotheses, evaluating values,
[or] validating knowledge." 82 Stated differently, the individual has "no
internal procedure for subjecting [the] inferences [of the discipline being
studied] to systematic evaluation or critique, [and] can[not] . .. organize its
179 Taylor, supra note 85, at 204.
80 d
181 See KEGAN, supra note 21, at 5 ("It remains for us to look at the curriculum of
modem life in relation to the capacities of the adult mind."); MERRIAM ET AL., supra note
13, at 329-40 (examining theories of William Perry, Pat King, and Karen Kitchener
(Reflective Judgment Model), Mary Belenky (Women's Development Theory), and Marcia
Baxter-Magolda (Epistemological Reflection Model)). With important differences, each of
these theories moves beyond a view of learning and meaning making as learning the rules
of a discipline. The advanced stages of each of these theories share important
characteristics: an increased tolerance for uncertainty, development of judgment based on
evidence, and personal authorship (construction) of knowledge. See also SHEELAGH
O'DONOVAN-POLTEN, THE SCALES OF SUCCESS: CONSTRUCTIONS OF LIFE-CAREER SUCCESS
OF EMINENT MEN AND WOMEN LAWYERS 89-167 (2001) (examining themes emerging from
research on successful Canadian attorneys and relating those themes to Kegan's
developmental theories, and according to this study, successful lawyers demonstrate many
features of third, fourth, and even fifth order consciousness).
182 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 286. Professor Kegan develops an extended critique of
social constructivism, summarized here, which charges that it fails to facilitate student's
development of this higher order analytical competence. Id. at 287-93.
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inferences into a more complex whole (a formulation) or create a complex
whole that will itself generate inferences." 83
This limitation of the third order epistemology leads Professor Kegan
to a critique of social constructivism and its implications for higher
education.18 4 Understanding Kegan's views refines the criticism offered
earlier in Part IV.A of this Article that the social-constructivist model
valorizes the role of the community at the expense of individual cognitive
development. 185
Professor Kegan charges that social constructivism "romanticizes" the
community and does not leave the student better equipped to critically
examine the community's values, practices, and beliefs.186 Indeed, Kegan
draws an example from the law to illustrate his point; he observes that
most United States citizens are "socialized ... into the language of the
constitutional 'discourse community.'""' However, when queried about
their personal beliefs, they would deny many individual protections of the
Bill of Rights to members of society.'8 8 While citizens speak the language
of our Constitution and consider constitutionalism an important part of
their civic identity, they cannot experience or examine the tension and
dissonance that arises from disagreement with particular tenets and values
of the Constitution itself.
Most significantly for teachers of law, this kind of education as
socialization leaves students with "no greater capacity to resist induction in
the future into communities of discourse less benign than the ones social
constructivists imagine-totalitarian 'discourse communities,' for
example."' 89 Examples from history abound: slavery, fascism, and racism
have at various times and in various places been supported by robust legal
apparatus.' 90 Excessive emphasis on the social view in education does not
' Id at 286.
184 Id at 287-93.
185 See discussion supra notes 108 and accompanying text.
186 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 289.
187 id.
188 id.
18 9 Id
190 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and
XVI (commonly known as the "three-fifths rule"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967)
(describing statutes aimed at prohibiting interracial marriages); Jonathan A. Bush, Free to
Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave Law, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417,
456 (1993) (discussing how early American slave law was derived from the constitutional
law of the British Empire); Martti Koskenniemi, 'By Their Acts You Shall Know Them...'
(continued)
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necessarily equip individuals to perceive limits in the dominant paradigms
of the day or to perceive conflict between those paradigms and more
fundamental values. Membership in these communities does not include
an ability to stand apart from the community and appreciate that
membership in a community can sometimes involve blindness to the
community's evils. To be sure, Kegan recognizes that social constructivist
academics often examine the ways in which their disciplines are
incomplete, inconsistent, and flawed in their search for meaning and truth,
but he concludes that this message presented to students in the context of
an educational system that does not support this kind of reflective thinking
"may be pitched to a range that is out of the hearing of
most . . . students."l 91
These reflections on the philosophy of education permit us now to
return to basic principles. The concept of learning to "think like a lawyer"
and the signature Socratic pedagogy of law school share fundamental
flaws. First, the implied epistemology assumes a shared pattern of
lawyerly thought, failing to recognize the great diversity of modern
approaches to legal problems. Second, this epistemology does not
empower students with a capacity to reflect on how lawyers think-in sum,
to move beyond the socializing values of the third order of consciousness.
In seeking integration of cognitive achievement, practical skill, and ethical
reflection, the Carnegie Report pushes beyond the limits of the social
constructivist view and the third order epistemology.
4. The Fourth Order of Consciousness: The Self-Authoring Way of
Knowing
Fourth order consciousness has been termed the "self-author[ing]" way
of making meaning.19 2 It typically emerges in adulthood, although not all
adults reach this balance. Kegan's empirical work suggests that "[a]t any
given moment, around one-half to two-thirds of the adult population
appear not to have fully reached the fourth order of consciousness." 93
Despite this reality, the self-authoring value of the fourth order has been
deemed to "match the expectations of the professional workplace," and
(And Not by Their Legal Theories), 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 839, 843 (2004) (explaining that
Nazi legal doctrines were borrowed from multiple sources).
'19 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 292.
192 See Garrett McAuliffe, The Evolution of Professional Competence, in HANDBOOK OF
ADULT DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 476,478 (Carol Hoare ed., 2006).
19 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 188-91.
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stimulating thought pattern has been posited as a task of graduate and
professional training.19 4
Major concerns at the fourth order include autonomy and self-
determination.' 95 Kegan devotes a full six chapters of In Over Our Heads
to exploring ways in which modern life demands a self-authoring
psychological stance.196 A complete summary of all the characteristics of
fourth order epistemology exceeds the scope of this Article. However,
understanding the process of legal education requires a richer view of
fourth order epistemology in the interpersonal or social and educational
domains.
In the interpersonal realm, the individual at the fourth order is no
longer defined by social context but instead can reflect on and examine that
context.'9 7 Identity has permanence despite the demands of social context;
in Kegan's terms, the self can "maintain[] a coherence across a shared
psychological space," whether that space is shared by others in intimate
relationships, in professional affiliations, in religious commitment, or in
civic bonds.'98 Because of this coherence, individuals at the fourth order
can take perspective and reflect on their roles within social contexts and
systems.' 99 This means that lawyers and law students who function at the
fourth order have the capacity to critically reflect on the legal system as a
whole and on their own interaction with and role in the system.
Underlying this autonomy is a self-authoring epistemology. At the
fourth order, knowledge is no longer the property of external authorities or
experts; instead, it is constructed "through experience, reflection, [and]
analysis," informed by thoughtful use of "teacher, texts, [and]
authorities."2 00 In educational settings, the individual is what experts have
termed a "self-directed learner." 201 As a result, she is not threatened by
feedback but sees it as an opportunity for personal growth and change.202
194 McAuliffe, supra note 192, at 485.
195 Id. (citing numerous studies).
196 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 302-03 (summarizing the main claims for fourth order
consciousness in the domains of parenting, partnering, work, citizenship, therapy, and
schooling).
197 See DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 27.
198 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 100.
199 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 27.
200 Taylor, supra note 85, at 208 tbl.9.4.
201 Id. at 205. See also DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 27 (also often referred to
as a "self-authoring knower"); McAuliffe, supra note 192, at 485.
202 See DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 28; Taylor, supra note 85, at 204-05.
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At the fourth order, law students and lawyers are not wed to the legal
view of the world. They can make systematic critiques of the law by
observing both how numerous aspects of the legal system interact with
each other and from observing the moral reasoning that takes place as the
values of the legal system interact with their own personal values.203
This fourth order capability provides insight into the "difficult"
question of change in legal discourse identified by Rideout and
Ramsfield.20 Changes are introduced in the discourse as individuals
author new paths that are both critical of the legal system of thought-of
the discourse-project itself-and that mediate legal and nonlegal concerns.
For example, fourth order consciousness supports the ability to examine
how lawyers and courts select legally significant facts upon which to base
legal analysis. As scholars have noted, the business of selecting legally
significant facts is laden with unexamined assumptions. Professor Mertz
has noted that a lawyer's approach to facts is intrinsically
decontextualized.20 5 In her view, this decontextualized approach demands
that facts be placed "within the framework of the relevant precedential
legal categories instead of focusing on morality or narrative structure."206
A lawyer who functions within the third order of consciousness may
discuss and debate which facts are or should be legally significant. A
lawyer moves towards fourth order consciousness as she examines whether
she should place facts within appropriate precedential frames or whether
she should bring narrative or moral reasoning techniques to bear on
traditional legal discourse.207 In balancing these concerns, the lawyer
becomes conscious and aware of her ability (or lack of ability) to
contribute to the discourse, and ultimately, to change it.
203 I note here that a fourth order way of knowing underlies the questions Professor
Schlag believes law school should be teaching students to ask. See supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
204 See supra note 107-108 and accompanying text.
205 See MERTZ, supra note 50, at 92.
206 Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and
Anthropological Translations, J. MARSHALL L. REv. 91, 102 (2000).
207 For a consideration of the role of storytelling in legal writing, see Jeanne M. Kaiser,
When the Truth and the Story Collide: What Legal Writers Can Learn from the Experience
of Non-Fiction Writers About the Limits of Legal Storytelling, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
163 (2010). For a collection of recent contributions to the storytelling/narrative topic in
recent legal scholarship, see Preface to 7 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS, at viii-ix
(2010), http://www.alwd.org/LC&R/Currentlssues/201 0/pdfs/preface.pdf.
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Increasingly, students must not only understand the legal system and
analyze issues on the legal system's own terms, but they must also have a
fourth order capacity for autonomous reflection on the legal system.
Success in the legal profession often requires that they construct meaning
through experience, reflection, and analysis rather than seeking answers
from outside experts such as law professors, judges, or even the law
itself.208 Students must learn to recognize the value judgments that
underlie law and must bring their own experience to bear on legal analysis.
They must hone their critical sense and develop judgment so they can
understand when to challenge the law's apparent requirements and when to
turn to nonlegal solutions. The aim of legal education should be to
produce lawyers with the wisdom, experience, and courage to operate
within and beyond the legal view of the world.
V. A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
The task before legal educators is to facilitate learning in ways that
give range to students' fullest developmental capacities. Academic
environments must do justice both to the social view of legal education and
to robust notions of individual development. Law schools must remain
conscious of the enormously complex cognitive tasks of lawyering, even
while locating those tasks in real world contexts and instigating mature
ethical reflection on the professional role. A one-size-fits-all approach to
these challenges will not do; each school must look closely at where their
graduates will practice to design a curriculum that prepares students for the
unique challenges they will face.
Generally, law schools should support the move to what Kegan terms
"personal psychological authority," that is, the fourth order of
consciousness. 20 9 The self-authoring way of knowing best permits lawyers
to function within the legal community without being consumed by it.2 lo A
208 At this point, I must add a crucial aside. Kegan observes that university faculty are
well versed in these kinds of fourth order critiques and have in some ways begun to move
past the fourth order's embeddedness in a complex, personal ideology to consider more
ultimate issues. KEGAN, supra note 21, at 292 (describing the fifth order of consciousness).
He notes, however, that asking faculty to "support a move to just the order or consciousness
they themselves are currently happy to be leaving behind" (i.e., the fourth order) may be a
"especially unappealing assignment, since there is no order of consciousness that holds less
charm for us than the one we have only recently moved beyond." Id. at 292.
209 KEGAN, supra note 21, at 292.
210 See O'DONOVAN-POLTEN, supra note 181, at 171-204; McAuliffe, supra note 192,
at 485.
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self-authoring view also best enables students to apply the cognitive legal
processes that law schools now teach so well to the contexts presented by
practice in a professional and ethical manner. Formed in this way, lawyers
at the bar should be able to both effectively deploy legal skill on behalf of
clients and stand aside from the legal system to pursue nonlegal solutions
or change in law when they are in the interests of clients or society. To
better understand this vision, let us return to my first-year classmates who
struggled to advise Alice Trudlow, the fictional client described at greater
length in Part II of this Article.
Alice wanted to pursue a civil claim against eighteen-year-old William
Jennings for having sex with her fifteen-year-old daughter, Samantha, who
suffered a tubal pregnancy. Unfortunately, this claim appears to lack merit
under the rule of Barton v. Bee Line, Inc.2 1 1 Barton declared consent a
defense to a civil claim for battery arising from a statutory rape.212 The
student-lawyers know-but Alice does not know-that Samantha would
testify that she consented to the intercourse.
In this posture, my first-year classmates struggled to explain to Alice
Trudlow that her claim likely lacked merit. By narrowing their
presentation to a robust defense of the Barton rule, my classmates acted in
accordance with second or perhaps third order principles. For them, the
law was a strong external authority-they had no agency in the situation,
either to advise a course that would challenge the law, or to advise ways to
maneuver within the legal system that would avoid the Barton rule.
While drawing conclusions about the developmental state of others
must be done cautiously, it is nonetheless fair to say that the behaviors my
classmates exhibited in advising Alice Trudlow had clearest parallels with
the second order, the instrumental way of knowing. They viewed the law
as a static, fixed authority embodied solely in the Barton case. Further,
this legal authority had great control-not only did it guide the outcome on
a particular legal claim for these students, but it dictated a normative or
moral stance that they seemed to feel obligated to take vis-a-vis their
client. My classmates seemed genuinely perplexed by Alice's
bewilderment at their suggestion that Samantha was uninjured. They
struggled to hold multiple perspectives at once: they could not, in the
moment, accommodate Alice's views and the rule of Barton, and they
could not conceive their own role as something other than apologist for the
211 265 N.Y.S. 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
212 Id at 285.
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legal system. These behaviors are characteristic of the second order of
consciousness.
Many might attribute the shortcomings in the students' advice to Alice
to a poorly constructed hypothetical or to inadequate education about the
governing law. Through the developmental lens, this critique would point
towards better socialization as lawyers-Kegan's third order of
213development. Surely, my classmates would have advised Alice better
had they considered the possible criminal charge against Jennings or if
they had a better appreciation of the ethical issues involved. They had no
idea at the time whether they were obligated to maintain Samantha's
confidence. 2 14 One can imagine a curriculum--even a curriculum in the
current Socratic pedagogy-that would lead to a better view of how the
legal system works, including: better readings, a guided discussion to
prepare students to arrive at some working answers to the legal issues
involved, and perhaps a writing assignment asking them to plan the advice
they intend to give Ms. Trudlow. All of this would lead to a more effective
use of the legal system-a worthy third order goal rightly pursued in many
parts of the academy.
However, the deepest tensions in Alice Trudlow's case-and in the
lives of lawyers more broadly-are only mediated through the self-
authoring view of the fourth order. Students should be asked to confront
the limits of the law-both its internal flaws and inconsistencies and its
inability to address deep, intractable, and ultimately human problems.
Students should also be asked to recognize that the role of a lawyer
involves more than mechanical application of the law and provision of
legal advice.
To achieve these ends, the developmental view requires that legal
education be reconceptualized. The developmental view posits that
education is not merely the collection of "cumulative bits of knowledge or
even heightened understanding of complex concepts."215 Instead,
education should prompt a "change[] in general worldview."216 This kind
of education (1) sets learners on a "growth trajectory" and guides them to
make "progress to more advanced knowledge levels"; (2) includes learning
213 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
214 I realize one might argue that this was a class in torts, not criminal law or
professional ethics, but client problems do not come neatly packaged, and even the
casebook makes a brief, if totally inadequate, excursion into these allied issues.
215 McAuliffe, supra note 192, at 479.
216 Id. See also MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 130-44 (describing various theories
of transformational learning).
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experiences which produce "fundamental restructuring," i.e., "qualitative
shifts in knowledge reorganization"; and (3) builds support for "self-
scaffolding," by which learners become able to construct "more advanced
knowledge" independently.217  Self-scaffolding becomes the basis for
lifelong learning.
Applied to law schools, these principles suggest three directions for
reform. First and most importantly, the philosophical stance of legal
educators with respect to knowledge creation must shift. Knowledge
should not be simply transferred from teacher to students in the classroom,
nor should it be "drawn out" of students by professor-sages. Instead,
students should be expected to create knowledge by learning from each
other and from experiences with peers and professors. This shift is
fundamental to instigating a self-authoring view.
Second, law schools must require students to write more. Legal
education presently expects law students to listen and speak more than to
write. It is simply harder for students to create legal thought and
knowledge if they are not capturing their ideas in writing. It is also much
harder for them to see the transformations that are taking place in their
ways of knowing without examining the evidence that written assignments
can provide. Opportunities to write and receive feedback on writing can
give students the range and appropriate support to claim their full place in
the legal community.
Finally, law school must become richer in experiences and
opportunities to reflect on those experiences. Only through experience can
students gain detached perspective both on the legal system and on the
transformations of knowledge that are taking place within themselves.
Fully applied, these reforms would require fundamental changes in the
way law schools are organized and financed and in the way legal education
is delivered. I add my voice to the chorus of people demanding such
changes. However, meaningful improvements to the present situation
should not be sacrificed to the uncertainty of revolution.
A. A New Paradigm for Knowledge Creation
Legal education should follow a new paradigm for knowledge
creation. The present Langdellian paradigm posits education as either a
217 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 18; Nira Granott, We Learn, Therefore We
Develop: Learning Versus Development-or Developing Learning?, in ADULT LEARNING
AND DEVELOPMENT 15, 18 (M. Cecil Smith & Thomas Pourchot eds., 1998); McAuliffe,
supra note 192, at 479.
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process of knowledge transfer from professor to students or as a process of
the professor-expert drawing insight out of students.218 While this model
may equip law students with information that will be helpful in their career
endeavors, it is a remarkably inefficient way of helping them become
creative and independent lawyers. Upon entering practice, lawyers are
increasingly expected to think critically and creatively about difficult
problems. 21 9 Lawyers are expected to think carefully through client needs
and apply both legal and nonlegal tools in dynamic and ever-changing
contexts to achieve satisfactory and ethical resolutions. To be prepared to
do this, law students must learn that lawyers themselves generate
knowledge in their field.220 Stated differently, lawyers generate law, they
do not merely research and repeat it.
The educational model must mirror this reality by becoming a place
where knowledge arises from the students-where students investigate law
and facts, learning with and from each other with the guidance of the
professor as an available and valuable resource. This environment
supports the emergence of Kegan's fourth order of consciousness. 2 2 1 As
previously noted, as individuals transition from third to fourth order
consciousness, knowledge becomes less a commodity to be received from
experts and more a product to be constructed based on one's experiences
218 See Kimball, supra note 66, at 279 ("Langdell introduced the inductive and Socratic
case method of teaching [at Harvard] and practiced it assiduously."); Stephen Wizner, The
Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests ofJustice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929,
1930-31 (2002) (noting Langdell's use of the Socratic method as "the interrogation of
students by the professor" to elicit the legally important facts, issues, and holdings from the
readings).
219 See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 16-27 (arguing that the goals of law school
must expand to better prepare graduates to enter practice); Tonya Kowalski, True North:
Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 51, 51-
53 (2010) (positing that "'transfer of learning' is at the very essence of what lawyers do
every day," and arguing that the law curriculum must impart "a greater understanding about
how to translate knowledge and skills to other courses and, eventually, to practice").
220 See Aiken, supra note 36, at 294 ("The critical thinker must recognize herself as a
legitimate source of knowledge along with authorities, such as the teacher or case law and
statute.").
221 Kegan himself posits schools as "holding environments" that facilitate
transformative change in their students through an appropriate balance of demands and
supports. See DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 35.
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and information gleaned from a variety of sources; and the student must be
prepared to judge whether the source is reliable.222
To accomplish this kind of environment, law teachers must be
prepared to let the student voice dominate in the classroom. Students must
be expected to ask their own questions, to search for the answers, and to
evaluate the choices they make in that process. Both inside and outside the
classroom, students must act in ways that they will as lawyers-exploring
the vagaries of facts, law, and legal strategy. Through preparation for
class, classroom experiences, and-most importantly-assessment
activities, students should be expected to own the processes of thought that
are essential for the practice of law.
Returning to the case of Alice Trudlow, imagine that the law had been
presented in a less absolute way. Imagine that we had been asked not only
to read Barton but also to research tort and ethics rules in specific
jurisdictions. Not only might students see for themselves that different
jurisdictions treat civil liability for statutory rape differently, they might
also develop some sense of the complex legal, political, and cultural
reasons why this is so. Perhaps with a broader legal perspective, my
classmates would have been less captive to the harsh rule of Barton in
advising Ms. Trudlow and more creative in their approach to resolving the
situation. A more creative approach might exemplify a better third order
understanding of the law and its possibilities, which could also push
towards a mature fourth order view that sees shortcomings of the dominant
legal approaches to the problem and looks for solutions beyond the legal
realm.
Consider the results if the torts casebook did not declare (as the current
edition still does) that the case would prompt many law students to believe
they should have gone to business school instead.223 In the alternative,
students might be prompted to confront the challenges of the situation and
asked directly which challenges are most difficult. Undoubtedly, many
students would focus on the legal uncertainty, particularly around the
ethical rules; but the questions whether to maintain Samantha's confidence
and whether to encourage or discourage Ms. Trudlow from suing or
instigating criminal prosecution of William Jennings are not only legal. At
least some students might reflect more deeply on the proper role of a
222 See discussion supra notes 162, 165, 180-182, and accompanying text. Indeed, as
these sources demonstrate, most stage theories of development regard a less absolute
approach to knowledge as characteristic of higher and more complex stages.
223 HENDERSON, supra note 28, at 43; HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 42.
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lawyer in the face of client's strong wishes. This type of exercise might
indeed help students appreciate the lawyer's role or even understand what
area of legal practice suits them. At the least, the Trudlow problem should
introduce students to the fourth order tensions that they will mediate in the
course of their legal careers.
Changing expectations of students also involves changing the
professor's role in the educational process. Inside the classroom,
professors must cede center-stage. Robust research among adult learners
focuses on the benefits of creating learning cohorts and using collaborative
learning techniques.224 Learners at different points on the developmental
spectrum can each glean benefits from collaborative learning or group
work techniques: at the second order, learners use groups to help discover
the "right" answers; at the third order, learners absorb the values and
practices of the group; and at the fourth order, learners balance varying
points of view and learn to see value in the process of understanding and
(at times) reconciling areas of commonality and difference. 22 5 Researchers
have demonstrated benefits flowing from these types of educational
techniques in the academic, emotional, and cognitive realms.226
For law students, the benefits of cooperative or collaborative learning
include a deeper understanding of legal substance as well as inspiration
and support for the sometimes-difficult intellectual and emotional tasks of
227lawyering. In groups, students can help each other see nuances in legal
doctrine and niceties of how that doctrine applies to real or simulated client
228
situations. In groups, students find support for making decisions about
how to handle legal problems and for taking the sometimes brave steps that
lawyers must take, whether those steps involve facing an unfriendly judge
at oral argument, pursuing answers relentlessly in the examination of a
hostile witness, or presenting a singularly unwelcome demand (to the client
229or to an opposing party) in a negotiation.
When students approach problems in groups, the teacher becomes a
"facilitator and enabler of meaningful, enjoyable, challenging learning." 2 30
Students must be put in positions of authority, positions where they are
224 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 72-102.
225 Id. at 99-102 (presenting results of an empirical study done in the context of Adult
Basic Education/English as a Second Language courses for adult employees at Polaroid).
226 Id. at 156.
227 GERALD F. HESS ET AL., TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAw 2, at 127 (2011).2281 d. at 128.
229 id
230 McAuliffe, supra note 192, at 480.
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responsible to each other, and positions where they must provide
reasonable feedback to each other about the content and process of what
they are learning. 23' The teacher supports the process, serving as resource
and advisor to the students as necessary.2 32
In the Trudlow case, two of my classmates were asked to
collaboratively advise the client. However, the shortcomings of their
interview were not a failure of the collaborative process; a better process
and a greater awareness of the developmental task at hand would have led
to much stronger results. My classmates and I were not adequately
prepared by the materials in the casebook to advise Ms. Trudlow. We
needed a better education about tort and ethics laws that applied to the
situation. Also, having never previously counseled a client, my classmates
needed to rehearse in advance their advice to Ms. Trudlow-perhaps with
one of them playing the role of Alice Trudlow and imagining her likely
reaction to their advice. After the advice session with the actress playing
Trudlow, my classmates needed a more substantial debriefing-they
needed to hear the actress-client's reactions to the advice she was given
and the professor's guidance on how to handle sometimes-delicate client
meetings. A professor who is aware of the developmental trajectory of
lawyers might be more attuned to my classmates' distressing failure to
differentiate themselves as lawyers from the substantive moral
commitments of the Barton case.
There are many opportunities in law classrooms to make students
responsible for finding, evaluating, and analyzing information. However,
engaging these principles at a deeper level which more readily prompts
mastery of complex law and appreciation of professional role requires
breaking down some of the walls that divide our present curriculum. For
example, torts class could use teams of student lawyers to investigate,
research, and report on a series of case studies. Civil procedure could be
taught in the context of legal research and writing so that students build
understanding of how procedural context influences legal argument.
231 See id. at 481. Former Dean Paul Brest of Stanford Law School observes that
traditional legal education implies a pedagogy that is solitary, noting that "[m]ost [law
school] class assignments, exams, and papers are individual endeavors." Paul Brest, The
Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58
L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 5, 15 (1995). The view articulated here attempts to respond to
this isolation.
232 For a variety of thoughtful and thought-provoking ideas about how to integrate
collaborative, cooperative, and team learning techniques into law classes, see HESS ET AL.,
supra note 227, at 127-52.
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Criminal law or procedure could be taught in ways that integrate principles
of professional ethics for prosecutors and defense attorneys. All of these
courses can spend time focusing on the role of a lawyer who practices in
that area. The goal of creating self-authoring lawyers who can integrate
subject area knowledge with legal skill in collaborative professional
contexts should drive further revisions to the law curriculum.
B. Writing as Vehicle for Learning
Lawyers recognize the central importance of writing,233 but often
provide only lip service in the form of vague rumblings of discontent about
the writing skills of new law graduates. Perceptions about legal writing
234
among the public at large are similarly negative. A renewed focus on
writing should logically flow from the fact that "most law students will
become professional writers: that is, they will make their living from
writing." 2 35 In a real sense, "[1]earning to write as a lawyer writes means,
in a very real sense, becoming a lawyer." 2 36
A developmental curriculum empowers students to grow through
237
writing. Writing sparks gains in the cognitive, practical, and ethical
arenas, the areas of concern to the Carnegie authors. To write, students
must understand the legal and factual materials at hand deeply and
thoroughly. They discover that the devil is so often in the details: subtle
factual arguments, intricate points of law, and creative legal analogies only
emerge in a thorough written examination of legal problems. Writing, in
233 Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 88, at 37.
234 See id. at 37-39.
235 Id. at 39.
236 Id. at 58. This view is echoed by Henry Perritt, former dean of Chicago-Kent
College of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology, who observes that "the ability to
communicate ties together an increasingly diverse legal profession." Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Taking Legal Communication Seriously, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 137, 137 (2001). Perritt calls
for "a fundamental rethinking of how legal education teaches the skills of legal
communication" through making better use of English composition theory, emphasizing
oral communication, and integrating legal writing with other parts of the law curriculum,
among other ideas. Id. at 138-41.
237 Although many commentators have written on this topic, I find refreshing Erwin
Chemerinsky's frank recognition that the present model of classroom instruction, in which
students write only a final exam and receive only a grade and little other feedback (indeed,
almost no personalized feedback), is "impossible to justify from a pedagogical perspective."
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595, 597
(2008).
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this sense, becomes a vehicle for understanding professional abilities in the
law; that is, understanding how to control the law and harness its power
towards preferred ends.
In addition, writing demands that the student attend to context-to the
audience(s) and purpose(s) of their communications. There are often
multiple audiences for a legal document including the lawyer's client,
opposing or negotiating parties, decision-makers or neutrals, and
sometimes even the public at large. Students must learn how to
communicate legal analyses and arguments effectively to both legal and
nonlegal audiences. Purposes may be simple and direct, e.g., to get a
motion allowed; or subtle and multivalent, e.g., to present a convincing
legal position that postures the matter for a negotiated resolution on
favorable terms. Navigating these waters requires a mature concept of the
lawyer's professional role.
In addition, writing can facilitate the kind of cognitive developmental
growth that undergirds mature professional identity. The current Socratic
flavor of legal pedagogy can result in a "dissonance between ... oral
prowess and ... written performance."23 8 Students are not given authority
and power to reflect in writing on the legal decisions they have read; they
are infrequently asked to explore their ideas and theories through written
form. Writing can prompt students to embrace third and fourth order
lessons by helping them learn to act as lawyers in the face of uncertainty
and recognize instances when the legal solution to a problem is inadequate.
Further, writing can require students to confront and regulate the conflict
of competing interests that come to the fore in written documents and in
the writer herself These conflicts range from the quotidian clash of
competing legal interests to the existential dilemmas posed by legal
arguments that implicate moral questions.
The case of Alice Trudlow demonstrates that writing assignments can
effectively teach the legal principles and prompt developmental gains.
Students might be asked to draft a letter to the client containing their
advice about whether a lawsuit in tort is likely to be successful, making an
objective prediction about the effect of Barton on such a suit, but also
wrestling with the state of the evidence: Can they tell Alice that Samantha
consented to sex with Jennings? They might be asked to draft a complaint
238 Susan L. DeJamatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of
Law, 40 DuQ. L. REv. 489, 521 (2002). The principal problem with the Socratic law
classroom is that students have woefully insufficient opportunity to practice the very skills
professors expect them to learn. Id. at 521-22.
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for such a lawsuit, this time marshalling facts and law in a persuasive form.
If some students were asked to do the former task while others were asked
to do the latter, even richer education about the law and ethics of the
problem would be possible. Students could greatly profit from deciding
what to include in each document. Students writing the complaint might
also learn that their duty of candor to the tribunal would not allow them to
leave out facts harmful to their case. 2 39 Either assignment would require
deeper engagement both with the law and with the lawyer's role than a
brief class discussion or role-play exercise can provide.
Beyond these two assignment ideas, students might be asked to write a
bench memoranda or a law reform piece debating whether the rule of
Barton should be overturned. While one could easily imagine the
arguments against Barton's antiquated reasoning and worldview, asking
students to defend the case might also prompt cognitive and developmental
gains, as well as insights into the role of lawyer as agent of the client and
the limits of what one will do in such a role. Writing on difficult topics
such as these can be an essential ingredient to focus a lawyer's critical
sensibility.
Again, the professor's role is dramatically altered. No longer primarily
a Socratic interlocutor, the professor becomes a mentor and coach while
guiding students through deliberately chosen rhetorical situations.
Through deeper and more thoughtful interactions with professors, students
will have more opportunities to construct the web of knowledge and
experience that leads them to self-author their pathway as lawyers. The
professor's job is to construct increasingly complex and demanding
situations that require more sophisticated approaches to the law, to have
dialogue with partners in the legal community, and to consider professional
identity and roles. A curriculum that is more closely aligned to the
cognitive development of its students and to the requirements of the legal
profession would include far more opportunities for students to write, to
receive feedback on their writing, and to revise.240
239 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012).
240 See Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools
Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REv. 561 (1997) for a collection of ideas about
how to integrate writing into law school classes. However, Parker does not fully explore
the ramifications of integrating writing into all law school courses. She notes that writing
opportunities "should not be overlooked" in doctrinal classes, noting that "[e]ncouraging
students to engage in 'two-way conversations' with their texts complements Socratic-style
and discussion classes by offering students a medium for expression and reflection, for
creative and critical thinking." Id. at 579-80. At least this much is true. In fact, my thesis
(continued)
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Unfortunately, too often writing is pejoratively labeled a "legal skill"
and its potential to prompt cognitive developmental growth is devalued and
marginalized. 2 4 ' Although Carnegie recognizes some of the importance of
writing as a vehicle for deep learning, 242 the academy has not yet fully
embraced this lesson. It is time to give up the norm under which the only
writing required and read in many, if not most, law courses occurs during
the final exam. Assignments and feedback can take varied forms and need
not be limited to the briefs and memos commonly taught in legal writing
classes. Faculty should experiment with assigning other legal documents,
including contracts, mediation statements, or settlement agreements, as
well as letters, e-mails, and the types of informal communications that are
increasingly populating the world of practice.243 Further, documents
unique to the academic environment such as reflection papers or critical
essays may also have a role to play in forming the professional identity of
young lawyers. Teaching more writing skills will not only serve the goal
of producing better writers, worthy as that goal is, but also it will produce
better lawyers who have more fully embraced their developmental
capabilities.
C. Experience as Foreground ofLaw School Education
In considering the relationship between experience and learning, John
Dewey hypothesized that "all genuine education comes about through
experience." 24 This insight, which seems obvious on its face, suggests
that educational outcomes can be predicted based on the kinds of
experiences in the program of study. Until quite recently, classroom
teaching has been the norm at American law schools, even considering the
is that full integration of writing which engenders more creative and critical thinking will
create a new post-Socratic curriculum.
241 See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education:
Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. Ass'N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 108-09 (2006).
242 See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 38-43. But see Lisa T. McElroy et al., The
Carnegie Report and Legal Writing: Does the Report Go Far Enough?, 17 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 279, 280-81 (2011).
243 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. (2012) (discussing
protocol for situations involving exchange of electronic communication).244 JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION 25 (1938).
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considerable progress that has been made by legal writing professors,
clinicians, and others.245
The role of experiential learning, which is coming into vogue in the
legal academy, has been studied through multiple theoretical lenses.246 The
constructivist theoretical perspective elevates reflection on experience as a
means of learning-knowledge is constructed through experience, and
students' ways of making meaning are transformed as they reflect on those
experiences.247 Because students capture their progress in writing,
reflection on experience is key to the transformative process that becoming
a lawyer entails.
Scholars have also posited other perspectives on experience. The
situative theory of learning elevates communities of practice and examines
ways in which "knowing is intertwined with doing."2 4 8 This understanding
of experience parallels the views of social constructivists. Unlike
constructivists generally, social constructivists locate learning in the
community rather than in the head of the student.24 9 On this view,
experiential learning causes the community to "refine its practices" slowly
over time.25 0 The proper response to the social-constructivist norm in legal
education is calling for greater attention to pathways of individual
development.251
There is little doubt that the law school model is evolving in the
direction of greater "experience." Simulations like the Alice Trudlow
problem can be extremely important forms of experience early in the
educational process. That said, they are just a beginning. Clinical
245 The Carnegie Report emphasizes that law schools tend to elevate "cognitive training
in the classroom setting." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 15, at 81.
246 MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 160.
247 Id. at 160 (citing TARA J. FENWICK, LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE 21 (2003)).
248 Id.
249 id.
2 50 d
251 Other scholars studying experiential education have taken the psychoanalytic view,
examining how unconscious desires and fears may reinforce of limit students' trajectories;
have embraced cultural critical perspectives, examining limits of dominant norms of
experience in society; or have focused on the aptly-named complexity theory, which looks
at experience as part of relationship, a complex interplay of "consciousness, identity, action
and interaction, objects and structured dynamics." MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 13, at 160.
While these perspectives are useful in various settings, often for explaining individual
students or educators, they are not as useful as the constructivist or situative theories for
understanding legal education, so I do not treat them in my text.
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offerings have increased and externships, simulations, and problem-based
courses are also finding places in the curriculum. 2 52 I have heard my
colleagues at Georgetown and elsewhere refer to these offerings as
comprising a "spectrum" of experiential opportunities; this language is
quite helpful in planning a legal curriculum. Not every experience offers
the same opportunities as live client interaction in clinic coupled with
expert guidance of clinical faculty. However, each type of experience,
from simulation to externship to live client representation, contributes to
the habits of mind and course of development of our students.
What matters is that the ethos of experience becomes pervasive. It is
not enough to insert add-ons, Carnegie-flavored courses, or single-course
requirements into the curriculum. Instead, all courses must be rethought
and evaluated for the kind and quality of experience they offer students.
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, there is reason to approach the developmental view with
caution. Understanding and prompting developmental change in others is
not an easy task, and most legal educators have no specialized training in
this area.2 S3 More advanced and complex stages of development are not
necessarily better stages for all individuals.2 54 Moreover, the transition
between stages of development and the emergence of later stages can bring
to the fore conflicts between the individual and environment that were not
salient in the prior stage. In making the transition, some individuals
experience unsettling anxiety and even psychological pain.2 55  Some
commentators have questioned whether it is appropriate for educators of
adults to "tamper with the worldview" of their students, noting that pursuit
of developmental goals can be "invasive."256
This consideration is legitimate and cautionary; however, it should not
cause educators to avoid the developmental view. When a student appears
to be in distress or to be experiencing some crisis arising from tensions
between professional and personal commitments, educators should respond
by referring the student to appropriate professionals. A large body of
252 For examples and commentary, see Roger J. Dennis, Building a New Law School: A
Story from the Trenches, 61 RUTGERS L. REv. 1079, 1083-89 (2008); Fine, supra note 65,
at 728, 738-46; Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law
Curriculum Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 62-67 (2001).
253 See discussion supra Part II.
254 DRAGo-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 22.
255 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
256 See MERiUAM, supra note 13, at 154.
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theoretical and empirical scholarship supports the idea that the professional
workplace requires fourth order consciousness;257 therefore, educators
should support the transformation to a self-authoring way of knowing.
Of course, not all law students will arrive at school at uniform stages
of development. Kegan and his followers have referred to the
developmental diversity of adult learners as creating a "new pluralism" in
the classroom,2ss and the data suggests that this diversity is also present in
law classrooms.259 Therefore, not all students will respond in equally
productive ways to the same pedagogical approaches. 2 60  As a result,
scholars call for a "correspondingly diverse collection of pedagogical
approaches and an awareness that these ways of knowing can evolve given
the appropriate challenges and supports." 2 6 1 Stated differently, the course
of study must allow students to enter at different levels while still
facilitating the development of all.
At a time when lawyers face increasing complexity in the professional
workplace, adequate preparation for practice demands that law students be
given the tools they will need to succeed. Students must consequently be
prepared to deal with the role of a lawyer perpetuated in the model rules: a
lawyer, "[i]n rendering advice,... may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation."2 62
257 See O'DONOVAN-POLTEN, supra note 181, at 171-204; McAuliffe, supra note 192,
at 477, 485.
258 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 154.
259 id.
260 For a particularly compelling example, see Taylor, supra note 85, at 206-08
(describing how a learning contract might be extremely effective for a self-authoring
learner, but not used to its maximum benefit by a learner with a socializing epistemology).
See also KEGAN, supra note 21, at 286 (describing the disjuncture between a student with
third order epistemology who faces fourth order demands).
261 DRAGO-SEVERSON, supra note 121, at 154.
262 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012).
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